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I.

INTRODUCTION

Hundreds of significant insurance cases are issued each year in
the construction industry. This paper focuses on cases issued
within the last five years, with particular emphasis on property
coverage. Subrogation issues are also addressed because these
often arise in property coverage settings. While many insurance
policies employ the same or similar language, when interpreting
insurance policy language, the courts often employ too little
uniform treatment. This certainly is so with respect to liability
coverage, but occurs in the property field as well.
II. INTERPRETING POLICY LANGUAGE
The principles employed to interpret insurance contracts are
well established in most jurisdictions. While the law differs a bit
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, broad agreement exists on the
fundamental principles. For example, most insurance contracts are
interpreted such that unambiguous terms are accorded their plain
1
and ordinary meaning. Moreover, a contract is not rendered
ambiguous just because one of the parties attaches a different,
2
subjective meaning to one of its terms. If, however, an ambiguity is
present, any doubt as to the existence of coverage must be resolved
3
in favor of the insured.

1. See 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 32 (4th ed. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See R & D Maidman Family L.P. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 783 N.Y.S.2d 205,
211 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
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While uniformity on fundamental interpretation principles
governing insurance contracts exists, the actual application of these
principles to particular policy language is anything but uniform.
The different approaches and conclusions reached by the Sixth
Circuit and the Oregon Court of Appeals in interpreting the term
“and/or” highlight the challenges in achieving consistent coverage
interpretation. In Detroit Water Team Joint Venture v. Agricultural
4
Insurance Co., a builder’s risk policy led to dispute because the
existing property exclusion listed two conditions connected by
“and/or.” This clause raised the question of whether coverage was
excluded when either condition existed or only if both conditions
5
were satisfied. The Sixth Circuit found the term unambiguous and
concluded that the exclusion applied “if either or both of the two
6
specified conditions are met.”
The Oregon Court of Appeals, however, found the phrase to
be ambiguous. In Saif Corp. v. Donahue-Birran, the language at issue
was contained in a state statute that affected the amount of
7
coverage afforded under a workers’ compensation policy. Unlike
the Sixth Circuit, the Oregon Court of Appeals found the term
“and/or” very difficult to interpret:
There is no easy answer to this conundrum because, in
this context, the “and/or” either has to mean “and,” in
which case SAIF is correct that claimant is not entitled to
benefits under the rule, or it means “or,” in which case
claimant is correct that he is entitled to benefits. There
simply is no way to give effect to both words, because
“and” leads to one result, and “or” leads to the other, and
there is no middle ground.
It is because of the inherent ambiguity of the phrase
“and/or” that virtually all reputable sources advise that
the phrase not be used. In Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary
of Modern Legal Usage 56-57 (2d ed. 1995), the use of the
term “and/or” is discussed at length. Garner notes that
the term has been vilified in case law for the past century,
4. 371 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 2004).
5. Id. at 341–42.
6. Id. at 342. See also Mich. Pub. Serv. Co. v. City of Cheboygan, 37 N.W.2d
116, 129 (Mich. 1949) (“There are occasions where intent may properly be
expressed by ‘and/or,’ indicating ‘both, or either.’”); Local Div. 589,
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 618, 627 (1st Cir. 1981)
(“[T]he words ‘and/or’ commonly mean ‘the one or the other or both.’”).
7. 96 P.3d 1282, 1283 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
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but that it is usually safe to assume that “x and/or y = x or
y or both.” He points out, however, that sometimes the
term is “inappropriate substantively as well as stylistically,”
because it is too indecisive, such as in a will that makes a
bequest “to Ann and/or John.” He observes that the
problems of indecisiveness can be cured by using either
“and” or “or,” depending on the meaning that is
intended. This case presents an excellent example of why
the term should not be used: The drafters of the rule must
have meant either “and” or “or” but could not have meant
both, as different results flow from each reading, and
there is no possible alternative reading that somehow
8
could give effect to both.
The Fourth Circuit engaged in an interesting analysis of policy
9
language in the unpublished decision of Tankovits v. Del Suppo, Inc.
The insured, Del Suppo, designed and constructed swimming
10
pools. It was sued by one of its customers, although the court
11
Del
provided few details as to the nature of the complaint.
Suppo’s general liability insurance policy is, conversely, discussed at
12
length.
In addition to the standard ISO policy form, the
declarations page made reference to a “Professional Liability
13
The policy itself, however, contained only
Coverage Part.”
14
oblique references to professional liability coverage. The policy
also contained an endorsement entitled “Errors and Omissions

8. Id. at 1285 (citations omitted). See also Am. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Webster, 118
S.W.2d 1082, 1084 (Tex. Ct. App. 1938) (“[T]he abominable invention, ‘and/or’,
is as devoid of meaning as it is incapable of classification by the rules of grammar
and syntax.”); Employers’ Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Tollefsen, 263 N.W. 376, 377 (Wis.
1935) (“[T]hat befuddling, nameless thing, that Janus-faced verbal monstrosity,
[used] as a cunning device to conceal rather than express meaning . . . .”);
Stanton v. Richardson, (1875) 45 L.R.Q.B. 78 (H.L.) (appeal taken from C.P.)
([S]ix judges had six separate interpretations of “and/or.”); Cuthbert v.
Cumming, (1855) 156 Eng. Rep. 668, (one of the first cases discussing the
problems of interpreting “and/or.”). See also DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF
THE LAW 309 (1963) (“Ultimately the decision must be made, which is it — A or B
or both? And this decision is not helped by and/or. That formula permits the one
person who should know what he is talking about to dodge the decision, and fobs
off the choice on a stranger — a lawyer, a judge — who may not have the slightest
notion what the writer really meant.”).
9. 129 F. App’x 829 (4th Cir. 2005).
10. Id. at 830.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 830–32.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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15

Extension.” This endorsement provided additional coverage for
“‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ due to any negligent act,
16
error or omission committed during the policy period . . . .” By its
express terms, the endorsement was subject to all policy
17
The endorsement made no mention of the
exclusions.
18
Professional Liability Coverage Part.
The insurer claimed that the extent of professional liability
coverage was that set forth in the errors and omissions
endorsement and, because policy exclusions applied to the claim,
19
no coverage existed. In response to the charge that this position
renders any professional liability coverage illusory, the insurer
posited that coverage would apply if bodily injury arose from the
20
insured’s negligent design of the swimming pool. The court was
skeptical, concluding that subjecting the endorsement to all policy
exclusions “appears to eliminate the potential for any coverage
under the E&OE endorsement, thus making coverage under such
21
endorsement illusory.” Notwithstanding the fact that the policy
contained no express language describing the extent of
professional liability coverage, the court found such coverage
existed and that the allegations asserted against the insured fell
within its scope:
Because professional liability coverage is generally
understood to provide coverage for special risks inherent
in the specific profession of the insured, one may
reasonably interpret the Policy’s separate listing of the
Professional Liability Coverage Part as providing coverage
for risks not covered by the Commercial General Liability
Coverage Part and its endorsements. Thus, at least one
reasonable interpretation of the Policy is that Del Suppo is
covered for all bodily injury and property damage claims
arising from its negligence, errors, and/or omissions in
the execution of its professional work, i.e., in the
construction of swimming pools and the walkways that
22
surround swimming pools.
Insurance policies contain provisions excluding certain losses
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 831.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 834.
Id.
Id. at 836 n.2.
Id. at 836 (citations omitted).
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from the scope of coverage. Policy exclusions are quite varied and
numerous. Whereas the insured has the burden of establishing
that a claim falls within the insuring clause, the insurer has the
burden of proving the facts necessary for the operation of a policy
23
Policy exclusions are strictly construed, and any
exclusion.
24
ambiguities are interpreted in the insured’s favor. Nevertheless,
where policy exclusions unambiguously preclude coverage, courts
25
will not re-write policy language to afford protection. Moreover,
26
undefined terms will be given their plain and ordinary meaning.
Because insurance policies are contracts, courts routinely
apply one or more contract interpretation rules when making
27
coverage determinations.
The policies are also standard form
agreements drafted by insurance companies; so, many courts
employ a variety of adhesion contract principles. This is particularly
the case with respect to interpreting policy exclusions. A federal
court, faced with having to interpret several insurance policies in
connection with a claim of property damage to a television
transmission tower, had occasion to use a variety of interpretation
28
The court’s description of the
principles under Nebraska law.
interpretation rules governing policy language hits upon many
common themes:
Under Nebraska law, courts must construe insurance
policies to give effect to the parties’ intentions at the time
the contract was made . . . . A contract must be construed
as a whole, and if possible, effect must be given to every
part thereof. In discerning the parties’ intentions, courts
should first determine as a matter of law whether a policy
is ambiguous. An insurance policy is ambiguous when a
word, phrase, or provision in the contract has, or is
susceptible of, at least two reasonable but conflicting
interpretations or meanings. Where a clause in an
insurance contract can be fairly interpreted in more than

23. See Luikart v. Valley Brook Concrete & Supply Co., Inc., 613 S.E.2d 896,
901 (W. Va. 2005).
24. 17 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 1, § 49.111.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See PHILLIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR
ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 11:17 (2002).
28. Fireman’s Fund v. Structural Sys. Tech., Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (D.
Neb. 2006) (finding an ambiguity in a property policy with respect to property and
interests covered).
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one way, there is ambiguity to be resolved by the court as
a matter of law.
Courts should determine whether a contract is
ambiguous on an objective basis, not by the subjective
contentions of the parties and are therefore not
compelled to find ambiguity simply because the parties
suggest opposing interpretations. The resolution of an
ambiguity in a policy of insurance turns not on what the
insurer intended the language to mean, but what a
reasonable person in the position of the insured would have
understood it to mean at the time the contract was made.
If a court concludes that a policy is ambiguous it may
employ rules of construction and look beyond the
language of the policy to ascertain the intention of the
parties. Rules of construction require that in the case of
such ambiguities, the construction favorable to the
insured prevails so as to afford coverage. When an insurer
wishes to limit its coverage, it is the duty of the insurer to
draft the terms precisely.
However, if a court determines that a policy is not
ambiguous then it may not resort to rules of construction,
and the terms are to be accorded their plain and ordinary
meaning as the ordinary or reasonable person would
understand them. In such a case, a court shall seek to
ascertain the intention of the parties from the plain
language of the policy . . . . [A] court prefers the natural
and obvious meaning of the provisions in a policy . . . .
Where coverage is denied, the burden of proving
coverage under a policy is upon the insured. However,
the burden to prove that an exclusionary clause applies
rests upon the insurer. Exclusionary clauses will be
29
liberally construed in favor of the insured.
A New York decision employed the contract interpretation
principle of ejusdem generis to conclude that exclusions in a property

29. Id. at 1023–24 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). See
also Nova Cas. Co. v. Waserstein, 424 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2006)
(holding that where policy language is plain and unambiguous, no special
construction or interpretation is required, and the plain language of the policy
will be given the meaning it clearly expresses); Tritschler v. Allstate Ins. Co., 144
P.3d 519, 529 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (determining that where an insurance
provision is susceptible to different interpretations, the court will attempt to
discern its meaning by examining the language of the provision, the purpose of
the transaction, and public policy considerations).
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policy do not apply to damages caused by demolition work on
30
adjoining property. In 242–44 East 77th Street, LLC v. Greater New
York Mutual Insurance Co., an owner sought coverage for settling
31
and cracking damage caused by demolition work. The insurer
contended that the policy provided no coverage as an exclusion,
entitled “Other Types of Loss,” set forth a list of excluded items
including settling, cracking, shrinking or expansion, wear and tear,
rust, corrosion, fungus, decay, deterioration or any quality in
property that causes it to damage or destroy itself, smog, nesting or
infestation, loss caused by dampness or dryness of atmosphere or
32
While the owner’s
changes in or extremes of temperature.
damages took the form of settling and cracking injuries, the court
33
concluded that the exclusion did not apply. Under the ejusdem
generis rule of contract interpretation, the company the word keeps
34
determines its meaning in a series of words. In this case, the long
list of excluded items had one characteristic in common: they were
35
limited to damages caused by natural phenomena. The owner’s
property, however, was damaged by the human activity of
construction operations on the adjoining property.
Courts seldom resort to analyzing extrinsic evidence when
interpreting policy language. Nothing, however, forbids a court
from delving into extrinsic matters, particularly when it concludes
that policy language is ambiguous. Because insurance policies are
standard contracts that are procured with limited negotiation, the
amount of material extrinsic evidence can be quite limited. What
little negotiation occurs often takes place between the insurer and
a broker or agent. The legal consequence of extrinsic evidence can
be influenced depending upon the status of the broker or agent.
Knowledge about the extent of coverage afforded known to the
36
insured’s agent may be imputed to the insured. On the other
30. 242–44 East 77th Street, LLC v. Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co., 815
N.Y.S.2d 507, 510–12 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 508–09.
33. Id. at 510.
34. Id. See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (8th ed. 2004) (defining ejusdem
generis as “[a] canon of construction that when a general word or phrase follows a
list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only
items of the same type as those listed.”).
35. 242–44 East 77th Street, 815 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
36. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hebert Const., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d
1214, 1226 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (determining that factual issues remained as to
whether agent/broker was acting as insured’s agent, thus imputing agent’s
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hand, representations with respect to coverage by an agent of the
37
insurer can bind the carrier to provide such coverage. Common
types of extrinsic evidence encountered in policy interpretation
include direct communications (often e-mail exchanges), premium
information, and the insured’s application and disclosure
statements. All three types of extrinsic evidence were evaluated in
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Hebert Construction, Inc., and
38
were found inadequate. Because insureds often do not know why
or how insurers price insurance, premium information is often of
little value unless a clear history of transparent premium
39
information exists.
Some insurance policies can become quite lengthy and
complex, given the number of coverage parts, endorsements,
exclusions, and riders. On occasion, an insurer will suffer the
consequences of this complexity if the exclusionary language it
relies upon is buried within the fine text of a complex document.
In USF Insurance Co. v. Clarendon America Insurance Co., a
commercial general liability carrier sued a number of other
insurers, claiming that they wrongfully refused to participate in the
defense and indemnity of a contractor being sued by a homeowner
40
for alleged construction defects. In concluding that an absolute
earth movement exclusion was unenforceable, the court focused
on its lack of conspicuousness and the insured’s reasonable
expectations with respect to coverage:
The exclusions to coverage set forth in the Clarendon
National and Clarendon America policies comprise
slightly more than six pages of text. The absolute earth
movement exclusion appears on the third of these pages,
four pages after the general insuring clauses. It is the only
exclusion in the Policies that contains any language
altering the defense obligation set forth in the insuring
clauses, and there is no heading or language in the
knowledge of coverage to insured).
37. See Nova Cas. Co. v. Waserstein, 424 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1340 (S.D. Fla.
2006) (acknowledging principle of promissory estoppel could well apply to deny
insurer the right to rely upon policy exclusion where its agent represented to
insured that coverage would be provided).
38. 450 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (W.D. Wash. 2006).
39. See Aetna Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Kent, 540 P.2d 1383, 1387 (Wash. 1975)
(suggesting that gross disparity of approximately thirty-to-one premium ratio
between types of policies made it reasonable to believe that both parties intended
the policies to provide mutually exclusive coverage).
40. 452 F. Supp. 2d 972 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
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Policies that puts the insured on notice of this fact. The
relationship between the statement of the duty to defend
found in the insuring clauses, and the limitation on that
duty inserted in the absolute earth movement exclusion,
therefore, is not plain and conspicuous. Additionally, the
scope of the exclusion’s limitation on the duty to defend
is ambiguous. The exclusion states that “where any claim
or suit is based in whole or in part on earth movement,”
the insurers will have the right, but not the obligation, to
defend the “lawsuit.” . . . Clarendon National and
Clarendon America contend that under the absolute
earth movement exclusion, they have no duty to defend if
the underlying complaint contains an allegation of earth
movement, whether or not that allegation concerns the
insured or some other defendant. The reference to
“claim or suit” can be read more restrictively, however, to
mean that the insurers have no duty to defend a lawsuit if
it includes an allegation that property damage caused by the
insured resulted, in whole or in part, from earth
41
movement.
....
Such an interpretation [that the exclusion is limited to
cases where the insured caused the harm] is consistent
with the objectively reasonable expectations of the
insured. An insured might reasonably anticipate, based
on the absolute earth movement exclusion, that if it is
sued for property damage caused in part by soil
movement, the insurer will have no duty to defend that
suit. An insured would not reasonably expect that its
entitlement to a defense would disappear any time it is
joined in a multi-defendant suit where a third-party
claimant asserts a claim involving earth movement against
42
some defendants, but not specifically against it.
III. PROPERTY INSURANCE
Property coverage protects an insured from loss in which it is
an insurable interest when the loss is caused by certain covered
“causes of loss,” or perils. Common covered causes of loss include
fire and wind. The form of property coverage often involved in
construction activities is a builder’s risk policy. Builder’s risk
41.
42.

Id. at 996–97.
Id. at 998.
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insurance protects those who have an insurable interest in a
building that is under repair, renovation, or construction. Unlike
commercial general liability (CGL) coverage, which protects the
insured against claims of third parties arising out of its acts or
omissions that result in bodily injury or property damage, property
43
insurance is first-party coverage.
A. Builder’s Risk Insurance
In the construction industry, the type of property policy most
often encountered is the builder’s risk policy. This variant of
property coverage applies to structures that are undergoing
44
construction or renovation. The types and sources of risks to real
property while a structure is under construction are materially
different than the risks encountered once the building is occupied.
Nevertheless, in terms of its general structure, the builder’s risk
policy is similar to property policies for completed and occupied
structures. One court discussed builder’s risk coverage thusly:
“Builders risk” insurance is a unique form of property
insurance that typically covers only projects under
construction, renovation, or repair . . . . The purpose of
builder’s risk insurance is to compensate for loss due to
physical damage or destruction caused to the construction
project itself.
A policy of insurance containing a
“‘builder’s risk’ clause or clauses should be construed
reasonably and if uncertain in meaning, in favor of the
contention of the insured so as to cover if possible a risk
45
obviously sought to be insured.”
43. See Gap, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 782 N.Y.S.2d 242, 244 (App. Div.
2004).
A CGL policy pays a third-party claimant according to a judgment or
settlement against the insured.
In contrast, insurance coverage for damage to property owned by the
insured or “first-party coverage,” pays the insured the proceeds when the
damage occurs, it protects an interest “wholly different” from that
protected by third-party coverage. “The principal distinction between
liability and property insurance is that liability insurance covers one’s
liability to others for bodily injury or property damage, while property
insurance covers damage to one’s own property.”
Id. (citations omitted).
44. See Royal Ins. Co. v. Duhamel Broad. Enters., 170 F. App’x 438 (8th Cir.
2006) (noting that the property policy did not respond to collapse of television
tower undergoing alteration by way of replacement of eighteen of more than one
thousand diagonal braces).
45. Fireman’s Fund v. Structural Sys. Tech., Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1025
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B. Insurable Interest
For a party to qualify for coverage under a property policy, that
46
party must have an insurable interest in the property insured. As
a general rule, the threshold for establishing an insurable interest
is not high. Occasionally, however, it becomes a matter of dispute.
For example, in Belton v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., an insured sought
recovery under its property policy for a loss to a building destroyed
47
by fire on which it had an option to purchase. The court held
that the insured could not recover under the policy because he did
not have any equity in the land and therefore, did not have an
48
insurable interest.
Two property coverage cases arising out of the World Trade
Center (WTC) disaster explore the concept of “insurable interest”
as it relates to property coverage. In Zurich American Insurance Co. v.
ABM Industries, Inc., a property insurer sought declaration as to the
extent of coverage for losses suffered by a contractor that provided
janitorial and heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC)
49
services in common and tenanted areas of the WTC buildings.
ABM did extensive maintenance and infrastructure work at the
WTC, employing more than 800 people in connection with its
50
operations at the complex. Zurich insured all of the properties
51
that ABM serviced throughout North America.
The policy
(D. Neb. 2006) (quoting Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. Am. Ins. Co., 142 N.E. 340, 341–
42 (N.Y. 1923)) (citations omitted). See also Broadmoor, L.L.C. v. Ernest N. Morial
New Orleans Exhibition Hall Auth., 867 So. 2d 651, 659 n. 8 (La. 2004).
46. See 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 277, § 11:107.
47. 602 S.E.2d 389 (S.C. 2004).
48. Id. at 391. But see, e.g., JAM, Inc. v. Nautilus Ins. Co., 128 S.W.3d 879 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2004).
An insurable interest may be a special interest entirely disconnected
from any title, lien, or possession. Thus, an insurable interest is not
dependent upon the insured having title to the property, but instead may
be derived from possession, enjoyment, or profits of the property,
security or lien resting upon it, or it may be other certain benefits
growing out of or dependent upon it. Moreover, to be an insurable
interest, the interest need not be such that the event insured against
would necessarily subject the insured to loss; it is sufficient that it might
do so, and that pecuniary injury would be the natural consequence.
Courts make every effort to find insurable interest, and to sustain
coverage, when there is any substantial possibility that the insured will
suffer loss from the destruction of the property.
Id. at 887 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. 397 F.3d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 2005).
50. Id. at 161-62.
51. Id.
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contained an insurable interest provision, which covered loss or
damage to “real and personal property, including but not limited
to property owned, controlled, used, leased or intended for use by
52
the insured.”
In addition, extra expenses “incurred resulting
from loss, damage, or destruction covered herein . . . to real or
personal property as described in [the Insurable Interest
53
provision]” were also covered. Another provision in the policy
provided business interruption coverage for losses resulting from a
lack of business due to “physical loss or damage, not otherwise
54
excluded, to insured property at an insured location.’”
The dispute between Zurich and ABM focused on the extent
of business interruption coverage, which, in turn, was governed by
55
the scope of the insurable interest provision. Zurich argued that
ABM had to have a property interest such as ownership or tenancy
in order to have the requisite level of “use” or “control” of insured
56
property. The court disagreed, finding that “[t]he existence and
configuration of the common areas and tenants’ premises were
57
vital to the execution of ABM’s business purpose.” “These areas
and premises were the means by which ABM derived its income
58
and were as essential to that function as ABM’s cleaning tools.”
ABM, therefore, “used” or “controlled” this property, so the court
found that ABM had an insurable interest in the covered
59
property.
In light of ABM’s substantial influence over, and
availment of, the WTC infrastructure to develop its
business, it is difficult to imagine what would constitute a
“legally cognizable ‘interest’ in the property,” apart from
ownership or tenancy. The terms of the insurance policy,
however, do not limit coverage to property owned or
leased by the insured. To the contrary, the policy’s scope
expressly includes real or personal property that the
60
insured “used,” “controlled,” or “intended for use.”
The Second Circuit revisited an insurable interest question in

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 165–66.
Id. at 166.
Id.
Id. at 167 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the context of the WTC disaster in Citigroup, Inc. v. Industrial Risk
61
62
Insurers. Citigroup leased twenty-four floors at Seven WTC. The
lease “obligated Citigroup to carry insurance on ‘Tenant’s
Property,’ defined as property ‘which can be removed without
jeopardizing the structural integrity of the Building’ or causing
63
‘irreparable damage . . . to the Building systems.’”
Citigroup
sought recovery under the landlord’s property policy for the loss of
its permanent but removable property. The landlord’s property
policy, however, did not cover “Tenant’s Property,” as defined in
the lease, and, therefore, the landlord’s insurer did not have an
64
insurable interest in Citigroup’s property.
C. Direct Physical Loss or Damage Requirement
In John S. Clark Co. v. United National Insurance Co., the court
considered whether a general contractor could recover under an
all-risk property policy for the costs incurred to repair defectively
built portions of a Parish Life Center for the Roman Catholic
65
Interestingly, the
Diocese of Charlotte, North Carolina.
design/build construction agreement required the owner to secure
“all risk” insurance for physical loss or damage, including damage
66
resulting from defective design, workmanship, or materials. The
owner purchased a property policy that agreed to indemnify the
owner and design/builder for all risks of physical loss or damage to
real and personal property occurring during the period of
67
During the course of construction, high winds and
insurance.
inadequately reinforced masonry walls resulted in a partial collapse
68
of the building.
The design/builder repaired not only the
collapsed portion, but also the defectively built portions of the
69
construction that suffered no wind damage. The court concluded
that the policy did not respond to the costs incurred to repair the
“undamaged” property as the repair of one’s own faulty
workmanship or negligent construction does not constitute

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

421 F.3d 81, 82 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id.
Id.
Id.
304 F. Supp. 2d 758 (M.D.N.C. 2004).
Id. at 761–62.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 762–63.
Id. at 763.
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“physical loss or damage” as required by the insuring clause of the
70
property policy.
D. Business Interruption Coverage
Standard property coverage responds to the “brick and
mortar” costs of replacing destroyed property. If the insured,
however, uses the property in a commercial activity, it is quite likely
that property loss will also cause business interruption damages.
Valuing business interruption loss can be tricky. Claims of lost
future profit may be attacked as speculative. Damages for lost
profits cannot be based upon hypothetical or speculative forecasts
71
of losses. Disputes over business interruption loss have a tendency
to devolve into duels between financial experts making forecasts
72
based upon past performance and industry indices.
70. Id. at 764-69. See also City of Burlington v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 332
F.3d 38, 41–45 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding coverage under a policy insuring
“against risks of direct physical loss or damage to the property insured” did not
extend to cover costs of repairing defective welds that had not yet failed); Trinity
Indus., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 916 F.2d 267, 270-71 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The
language ‘physical loss or damage’ strongly implies that there was an initial
satisfactory state that was changed by some external event into an unsatisfactory
state—for example, the car was undamaged before the collision dented the
bumper. It would not ordinarily be thought to encompass faulty initial
construction.”); Whitaker v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 115 F. Supp. 2d 612,
615-17 (E.D. Va. 1999) (determining that an “all risks” policy’s coverage of
fortuitous losses does not mandate coverage for the repair of construction defects
as part of a “direct physical loss”); N. Am. Shipbuilding, Inc. v. S. Marine &
Aviation Underwriting, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Tex. App. 1996) (stating that
“all risks” insurance policies need no express exclusion for damages due to faulty
workmanship or faulty initial construction because “Trinity makes clear that these
types of damage . . . are not covered to begin with.”); Wolstein v. Yorkshire Ins.
Co., 985 P.2d 400, 407-08 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that coverage under
a policy insuring against “all risks of physical loss of or damage” did not extend to
cover costs to repair faulty workmanship or faulty initial construction).
71. Iron Steamer, Ltd. v. Trinity Rest., Inc., 431 S.E.2d 767, 770 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1993).
72. See Blis Day Spa, LLC v. Hartford Ins. Group, 427 F. Supp. 2d 621
(W.D.N.C. 2006). The court concluded that plaintiff’s estimates were not unduly
speculative so as to remove the issue from the jury:
Hartford contends that Blis’s estimates of lost profits as a matter of law
are unduly speculative and therefore it is entitled to summary judgment
because there is no competent evidence of additional business
interruption losses. Specifically, Hartford points to the fact that: 1)
Heil’s calculations assume that Blis would have increased its number of
revenue producing hairdressers to sixty-six during the period of
interruption when in fact there were only fifty-six hairdressers; and 2)
Heil’s assumed revenue generated by each hairdresser, $6134, derived
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Another WTC case, Lava Trading, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co., discussed the length of time an insurer must pay for business
73
interruption losses. The insured maintained offices, including a
74
functioning data center, on the eighty-third floor of One WTC.
The insured sold computer programs to assist in the electronic
75
trading of equities in various equity markets. In addition to its
office in the WTC complex, the insured maintained a small, nearlycomplete backup location at 75 Broad Street that was not destroyed
76
in the terrorist attacks. Following the September 11, 2001, attack,
the insured converted its Broad Street location into a functioning
77
data center, and eventually to a more permanent location.
The insured asserted a claim under its business interruption
78
policy. A dispute arose over the amount of the claim and the
79
period of disruption. The business interruption policy provided
reimbursement for actual loss of business income sustained during
80
the period of restoration.
The policy defined “period of
restoration” as that period of time that begins with the date of
direct physical loss and “ends on the date when the property at the
described premises should be repaired, rebuilt or replaced with
from the industry average, grossly overstates the actual revenue
generated before, during, and after the period of interruption. In
response, plaintiffs argue Heil has provided ample support and
explanation for his methodology, figures, and assumptions employed in
reaching his estimates.
Heil first examined Blis’s financial
documentation and its business plan, and interviewed Blis’s management
and its supplier, Jim Barr. He then utilized the following factors to
calculate anticipated monthly business income: maximum available hours
of service operation, the most used hourly service rate, available service
providers, operational realization percentage, and Blis’s historical trends,
including what he considered its upward trend towards profitability. Heil
determined the maximum available hours of operation, and multiplied
that by the “most used hourly service rate” of $71. Heil then multiplied
this number by the anticipated number of service providers, based on the
space available, for the six-month period of interruption. He then
applied to that number a “realization number” of 40-55%, a number
derived by starting from the “industry” figure of 70%, the assumed
maximum efficiency rate for hairdressers, and then adjusting downward.
Id. at 630.
73. 365 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
74. Id. at 437.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 438–39.
79. Id. at 436.
80. Id. at 439.
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81

reasonable speed and similar quality.”
The insured took the
position that the period of restoration would not end until its new
82
facility was completed. The court disagreed, finding that coverage
terminated once the insured secured reasonable replacement
83
space to conduct its operations.
E. Valuing Property Losses
Property policies may be written on a number of different
reimbursement bases. For example, some policies pay the insured
the actual cash value of the insured property. Other policies are
written on a replacement basis. The Nebraska Supreme Court, in
84
Olson v. LeMars Mutual Insurance Co. of Iowa, wrestled with
determining the actual cash value of a loss to a grain storage
building, where the policy did not define the term. The court
explained:
As used in a property insurance policy, the phrase
“actual cash value” is a limitation on the amount of
recovery for the protection of the insurer. It is not a
substantive measure of damages. Where, as here, the
policy does not contain a specific definition, it has been
noted that [“]there is a priority of rules to determine
actual cash value as follows. (1) where market value is
easily determined, actual cash value is market value, (2) if
there is no market value, replacement or reproduction
costs may be used, (3) failing the other two tests, any
evidence tending to formulate a correct estimate of value
85
may be used.[”]
The insurer calculated the actual cash value of the loss based
on the cost of repairing the partially damaged building and making
81. Id.
82. Id. at 438.
83. Id. See also Streamline Capital, L.L.C. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. 02 Civ.
8123(NRB), 2003 WL 22004888, at *7–10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003) (reasoning that
the “period of restoration” ends by the time the insured, a former WTC tenant,
should have been able to reestablish its business operations elsewhere—in the
time its personal property in its WTC offices should have been repaired, rebuilt, or
replaced with reasonable speed and similar quality—not when the entire WTC is
rebuilt). But see Duane Reade, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 279 F. Supp.
2d 235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the term “property” in the applicable
period of restoration provision unambiguously referred to the “specific premises
at which Duane Reade operated its WTC store.”).
84. 696 N.W.2d 453 (Neb. 2005).
85. Id. at 458 (quoting 12 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 175:26 (3d ed. 1998)) (citations omitted).
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86

a deduction for depreciation from the cost of repair. While the
court acknowledged that this approach might work for completely
destroyed structures, it was inappropriate for partially damaged
structures:
We agree with the district court that on the record
presented, the policy did not permit the depreciation
deduction claimed by Le Mars. As we have previously
determined, the insured building had an actual cash value
of $200,000 at the time of the loss. In its damaged
condition, its value was reduced to $100,000, the price for
which Olson sold it to Land. Le Mars elected to calculate
its payment under the policy based upon the cost of
repairing the partial damage, which was $95,040. There is
no evidence that the repairs would cause the actual cash
value of the building to exceed $200,000. Recovery of the
full repair costs without a depreciation deduction will
therefore restore the value of the insured property that
existed immediately prior to the loss, but will not enhance
that value. Accordingly, we conclude that under an actual
cash value policy which does not expressly provide
otherwise, an insurer may not deduct depreciation from
the cost of repairing partial damage to insured property
where the actual cash value of the property, as repaired,
does not exceed its actual cash value at the time of the
87
loss.
The Sixth Circuit, in Parkway Associates, LLC v. Harleysville
Mutual Insurance Co., addressed the issue of whether a repair
contractor’s overhead and profit was a proper constituent in
88
calculating actual cash value of a loss. Parkway owned a hotel that
89
The parties could not agree on
was damaged by a tornado.
proper valuation of the loss, and the district court ordered the
86. Id. at 456–57.
87. Id. at 460–61. See also Kane v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 841 A.2d 1038,
1047 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (“[I]n the absence of clear language to the contrary, an
insurer may not deduct depreciation from the replacement cost . . . and the
phrase ‘actual cash value’ may not be interpreted as including a depreciation
deduction, where such deduction would thwart the insured’s expectation to be
made whole.”). But see Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. City of Coffeyville, 630 F. Supp. 166
(D. Kan. 1986) (ruling that insurer was entitled to deduct depreciation from the
cost of repairing a structure partially damaged by fire); Zochert v. Nat’l Farmers
Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 576 N.W.2d 531 (S.D. 1998) (permitting deduction of
depreciation from repair costs where policy differentiated between actual cash
value and replacement cost coverage, and insured elected former).
88. 129 F. App’x 955, 957 (6th Cir. 2005).
89. Id.
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90

parties to submit to the appraisal process required by the policy.
The appraisers issued an award with two different valuations:
$694,549, based on a replacement cost value, and $607,728, based
91
on an actual cash value. Both values contained an amount for a
92
The district court
general contractor’s overhead and profit.
determined that the policy permitted Parkway only to recover the
actual cash value of its loss, and further concluded that the
contractor’s overhead and profit should be deducted from the
93
actual cash value. In disagreeing with the district court’s analysis,
the Sixth Circuit stated:
Parkway’s policy provides that it is entitled to recover
the actual cash value of its loss. The actual cash value of a
loss is equal to the repair or replacement costs less
depreciation. The Tennessee courts have not determined
what repair or replacements costs include. Other courts,
however, have held that repair or replacement costs
logically and necessarily include any costs that an insured
reasonably would be expected to incur in repairing or
replacing the covered loss. Although there are some types
of losses where the services of a contractor would normally
not be utilized, there are many instances where the
insured reasonably would be expected to call a contractor,
especially where there is extensive damage. If a contractor
would reasonably not be required to repair an insured’s
loss, then contractor’s overhead and profit would not be
included in replacement costs. In the instant case,
however, Parkway would reasonably be expected to hire a
contractor to repair its property. Since the actual cash
value of a loss is the repair or replacement costs less
depreciation, and since the cost of a contractor would
reasonably be incurred in repairing Parkway’s damaged
property, then the costs of contractor’s overhead and
profit would be included in the actual cash value of
94
Parkway’s loss.
In Assurance Co. of America v. Adbar, L.C., Missouri’s “value
policy” statute, which prohibits property insurers from denying that
“the property insured thereby was worth at the time of the issuing

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 958.
Id. at 958–59.
Id. at 959.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 962 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of the policy the full amount insured” did not apply to a builder’s
95
risk policy. As the Eighth Circuit noted:
A “builders risk” policy is a common form of fire
insurance for buildings under construction in which the
policy declares the completed value of the building but
the insured pays a reduced premium in exchange for
lesser amounts of coverage prior to completion. It is
settled that the Missouri courts do not construe [Missouri
Revised Statutes] section 379.140 as requiring a builders
risk insurer to pay the declared completed value if the
policy obligates the insurer to pay only a lesser amount for
96
a fire loss that occurs prior to completion.
The boundaries of the valuation appraisal process called for
under most property policies were examined in Kendall Lakes
Townhomes Developers, Inc. v. Agricultural Excess & Surplus Lines
97
Insurance Co. An insured suffered loss to its townhouse complex
98
The insured’s appraiser estimated the
due to a windstorm.
covered loss at approximately $716,000, but the insurance carrier
99
said that the damage to all nine buildings was less than $1000.
100
Because of this, the deductibles did not cover the damage. Based
upon the conflicts in the appraisals, the trial court appointed an
umpire to determine the amount of loss. The court’s order
expressly reserved for the court the determination whether the loss,
101
in whole or in part, was caused by a covered cause of loss.
The
umpire, after reviewing the two appraisal reports and conducting a
hearing, entered an award that the insured “did not carry the
102
burden of proof to establish insurance coverage.”
The trial court confirmed the umpire’s award and the insured
103
The insured first argued—or at least the court
moved to vacate.
of appeal so characterized the argument—that, under Florida law,
the umpire had no authority to rule on the causation of the
104
damage. The Florida Court of Appeal disagreed, as causation is a
95. 129 F. App’x 334, 334–35 (8th Cir. 2005).
96. Id. at 334 (citing Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Doug Rose, Inc., 841 S.W.2d
698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)). See also MO. REV. STAT. § 379.140 (2002).
97. 916 So. 2d 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
98. Id. at 13.
99. Id. at 14.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 15.
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coverage question for the court when an insurer wholly denies that
105
Where the insurer acknowledges that a
a covered loss exists.
covered loss exists, causation is an “amount-of-loss question” for the
106
appraisal panel to determine. Nevertheless, the court vacated the
award on the grounds that the umpire exceeded the authority
granted by the trial court:
Contrary to the trial court’s order, the umpire did not do
as directed as the umpire’s report did not state the total
loss or “breakdown the amount of the loss by virtue of
excluded causes.” While an umpire has the authority to
resolve causation issues, since the trial court specifically
reserved this issue for the court’s determination, the
umpire in this case exceeded the authority granted to it by
the trial court. The trial court’s order additionally and
clearly states that “[t]he Court shall be the ultimate finder
of fact on the issue of whether the loss, in whole or part,
was caused by a covered cause.” In contravention of the
trial court’s order, the umpire did not fulfill the tasks
assigned to it and instead made factual findings as to
coverage, an issue not in dispute and an issue it lacked
authority to resolve; and causation, an issue which
pursuant to the trial court’s order, the trial court had
107
reserved for itself.
F.

Collapse Coverage

The cases discussing collapse coverage under a property policy
generally fall into one of three camps. The narrow view is that
collapse coverage is limited to the actual falling down of a covered
structure. The broad view is that any substantial structural
impairment that threatens collapse falls within coverage. A third
view is somewhere between these narrow and broad views and
includes the threat of imminent collapse. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, in 401 Fourth Street, Inc. v. Investors Insurance
108
Group, adopted the third view—sometimes referred to as the
“broad” view, depending upon the court’s perspective—and found
105. Id.
106. Id. at 16 (citing Johnson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 828 So. 2d 1021,
1022 (Fla. 2002)).
107. Id. (quoting Kendall Lakes Townhomes Developers, Inc. v. Agric. Excess
& Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2005 WL 2447887, at *3 (Fla. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2005)
(alteration in original).
108. 879 A.2d 166 (Pa. 2005).
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that policy language insuring against “risks of physical loss involving
collapse” provides coverage for the imminent collapse of a building
109
or part thereof. The Indiana Supreme Court, in Monroe Guaranty
110
Insurance Co. v. Magwerks Corp., determined that “collapse” for
property insurance purposes means substantial impairment of the
structural integrity of a building or any part thereof, and no
requirement exists of a sudden and complete disintegration of the
111
In Hilton Head Resort Four Seasons Centre Horizontal
structure.
Property Regime Council of Co-Owners, Inc. v. General Star Indemnity Co.,
damaged and deteriorating roofs, which included missing shingles
and rotten wood without any sagging or drooping, were insufficient
112
to trigger collapse coverage.
The competing theories over the scope of collapse coverage
reflect competing policy concerns. Narrow coverage is justified on
the grounds that to extend coverage for structural impairment
short of collapse turns the insurance policy into a sort of
113
maintenance agreement. Broader coverage is sometimes justified
on the grounds that to restrict policy benefits to instances where
the building actually falls down creates an incentive to forego
114
repairs to avert imminent collapse.
Property coverage for losses incurred as a result of the collapse
or partial-collapse of the insured structure can be a contentious
matter due to a number of factors, including policy language. For
example, in Assurance Co. of America v. Wall & Associates LLC of
Olympia, the policy excluded loss or damage caused directly or
115
indirectly by “collapse.” Nevertheless, the policy also stated that if
the collapse results from a “Covered Cause of Loss,” the insurer
109. Id. at 174.
110. 829 N.E.2d 968 (Ind. 2005).
111. Id. at 972.
112. 357 F. Supp. 2d 885, 886–87 (D.S.C. 2005).
113. See Doheny W. Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 70 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 260 (Ct. App. 1997) (expressing concern over turning insurance policies
into maintenance agreements, but nonetheless finding that “collapse” extended to
“imminent” falling down of the structure).
114. See Royal Indem. Co. v. Grunberg, 553 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (App. Div. 1990)
(agreeing with the “numerical majority of American jurisdictions [that] a
substantial impairment of the structural integrity of a building is said to be a
collapse” because to require the building to fall down would be “unreasonable” in
light of an insured’s duty to protect property from further damage). See also
Assurance Co. of Am. v. Wall & Assoc., LLC of Olympia, 379 F.3d 557 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding that policy covered not only actual collapse, but also imminent
collapse).
115. 379 F.3d 557, 560–63 (9th Cir. 2004).
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116

would pay for the loss.
Moreover, the policy responded to
117
In this case,
damages due to collapse caused by “hidden decay.”
water infiltration caused deterioration of bricks and wallboard,
which created a high risk of failure of structural support for the
118
brick facing. The insured undertook repairs to the façade before
119
it had a chance to collapse.
The insured claimed that the policy
responded to the loss because the building was in imminent danger
120
The district court ruled
of collapse due to “hidden decay.”
against the insured, holding that “collapse,” under the policy,
121
meant “a sudden falling down.” The Ninth Circuit disagreed:
The policy language at issue here comprehends a
broader meaning than what the district court assigned. . . .
The policy here states, “We will pay for loss or damage
caused by or resulting from risks of direct physical loss
involving collapse of a building or any part of a building
caused . . . by . . . hidden decay.” The term “collapse”
does not appear in the policy in isolation; instead, it is
qualified by the terms “risks of direct physical loss” and
“involving.” Certainly, as in Rosen, if the policy specified,
“We insure only for direct physical loss to covered
property involving the sudden, entire collapse of a
building or any part of a building,” and, in turn, defined
“collapse” as “actually fallen down or fallen into pieces,”
the district court would have properly attributed to the
word “collapse” the definition of “a sudden falling down.”
However, . . . the clause here contains much more. To
interpret the clause as a whole to mean that coverage
extends only upon “a sudden falling down” impermissibly
disregards the other aspects of the clause and renders
them ineffective. . . . We therefore conclude that this
policy language not only covers actual collapse but also
122
imminent collapse.

116. Id. at 559.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 558–59.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 559.
122. Id. at 563. See also Sandalwood Condo. Ass’n at Wildwood, Inc. v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that to recover for direct
loss involving “collapse” caused by hidden decay or insect damage, the structure
did not need to be in imminent danger of collapse, but damage to it had to
substantially impair structural integrity of the building).
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G. “Like Kind and Quality” Provision
Property policies may be drafted in such a way as to require the
insurer to replace damaged property with one of “like kind and
quality.” In Republic Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Mex-Tex, Inc., the
123
insured’s roof was damaged by a hail storm.
While the property
insurer was undertaking its investigation, the insured retained a
124
contractor to replace the roof for $179,000.
The replacement
roof was of the same kind as the prior roof, but was affixed to the
building mechanically, rather than by ballast, as was the original
125
The property carrier issued a check for $145,460,
roof.
126
representing the cost of an identical roof attached by ballast.
The insured objected, arguing that the roof it paid for was
“comparable” to its prior roof, and therefore the insurer should
127
have paid $179,000.
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with the
insured, finding that the “like-kind and quality” provision in “the
policy neither restricted nor required [the insured] to pay for the
128
cost to replace the roof with an identical one.”
The policy
allowed more leeway, and because the only evidence as to
comparability was the insured’s expert, the insurer was responsible
129
for reimbursing the full cost of the roof.
H. Inland Marine Coverage
Another form of property coverage sometimes encountered in
the construction industry is “inland marine” coverage.
The term “inland marine” technically applies to
transportation on the nation’s inland waterways . . . but by
the turn of the 20th century, “inland marine” had come to
signify insurance for property transported by land.
Today, most waterborne cargo is insured as “ocean” or
“wet” marine, which has its own standards of liability,
130
policy forms, and underwriting criteria.

123. 150 S.W.3d 423 (Tex. 2004).
124. Id. at 424.
125. Id. at 424–25.
126. Id. at 425.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Joseph S. Harrington, Inland Marine Insurance, ROUGH NOTES MAG., May 1,
2004, at 30.
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Contractors transporting expensive pieces of equipment often
131
insure against the risks of damage during the course of transit.
Inland marine insurance “function[s] basically as a form of
property insurance, even though the policy may explicitly
contemplate that the value of the property will be payable to the
132
owner rather than the insured.”
The federal district court in
Nebraska had occasion to discuss coverage under a “commercial
inland marine coverage form” in connection with the collapse of a
133
The opinion is somewhat frustrating because
television tower.
the facts are set forth in a separate memorandum and, therefore,
difficultly arises in determining the factual background that the
court actually applied to its coverage determinations.
The
commercial inland marine policy is described as covering a variety
of property (i.e., materials, machinery, and equipment for which
the insured has assumed liability and for which the insured has
contracted to install or erect), and the duration of coverage is
described as follows:
This policy attaches from the time the property is at risk
of the Insured and, except as excluded elsewhere in the
policy, covers continuously thereafter during transit, while
awaiting and during installation, and terminates when:
a. the interest of the Insured in the property ceases, or
b. the installation or erection of the property is
completed and accepted as satisfactory, or
c. this policy expires or is cancelled:
134
whichever of the foregoing conditions first occurs.
The court concluded that Fireman’s inland marine policy
responded to the damages due to the tower collapse, although it is
difficult to tell from the opinion what specific facts led to the
135
conclusion. The court’s analysis treats the inland marine policy
like a form of builder’s risk coverage.

131. See id.
132. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Carman Cartage Co., 636 N.W.2d 862, 866 (Neb.
2001) (quoting 11 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d §
154:3 (rev. ed. 1998)).
133. Fireman’s Fund v. Structural Sys. Tech., Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1016
(D. Neb. 2006).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1027.
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Boiler and Machinery Insurance

Boiler and machinery insurance coverage is another special
type of property insurance designed to cover losses associated with
equipment malfunction of pressurized, electrical, and electronic
machinery. Typical equipment covered by this insurance includes
boilers, generators, engines, pumps, compressors, and turbines.
Refrigeration and air conditioning equipment is also the subject of
this coverage. Common electrical objects such as transformers,
reactors, circuit breakers and other items that might be critical for
plant operation may be covered. This coverage is sometimes
encountered in instances where the contractor is responsible for
start-up and commissioning activities.
These policies usually require the equipment malfunction to
result from an accident, which is defined as a “sudden” and
“accidental” breakdown of the object or part of the object. Chronic
failures of equipment attributable to age are typically not
136
covered.
J.

Extra Expense Damages

After property loss, extra expense damages associated with
maintaining the business enterprise and costs associated with repair
and replacement that are not “brick and mortar” are another
137
The cost of renting other
common “soft cost” property loss.
space to maintain the business is an “extra expense” item.
Architectural fees and interest expense to rebuild are extra
expenses.
It is not uncommon for property policies to contain a variety of
sub-limits for soft cost items. The Georgia Court of Appeals, in RLI
Insurance Co. v. Highlands on Ponce, LLC, found an ambiguity in the
manner in which the property policy addressed soft and hard
138
139
costs.
A fire seriously damaged an apartment complex.
The
complex was insured through RLI in excess of $29 million for any
140
one occurrence.
In addition to this blanket limit of liability
136. See 515 Assoc. LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill., 160 F. App’x 147, 151
(3d Cir. 2005) (holding that boiler and machinery policy did not respond to
elevator breakdown that was neither sudden nor accidental).
137. See Patrick J. O’Connor, Jr., Handling Construction Risks 2007: Allocate Now
or Litigate Later, REAL EST. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (2007).
138. 635 S.E.2d 168 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
139. Id. at 169.
140. Id.
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provision, the policy also contained “additional limits of insurance”
for soft costs and lost business income, each to $100,000 per
141
occurrence.
RLI took the position that the amount of coverage
available for soft costs was $100,000 and a similar amount for
142
The insured took the position that these
business income loss.
were “additional” limits and applied “in addition to” the blanket
143
limit of $29 million.
The court found an ambiguity, which
precluded granting summary judgment in favor of RLI:
On the one hand, the contract could be interpreted to
mean that soft costs and business costs are limited to
$100,000 per occurrence, irrespective of the blanket limit
of $29,507,000. On the other hand, however, given the
clause that “additional limits” apply in addition to the
blanket limit of liability, and soft costs and business costs
were identified as having additional limits of $100,000, the
contract could also be interpreted to mean that once the
blanket limit has been exhausted, there remained
$100,000 for use to pay for liabilities in soft cost and
business income over and above the blanket limit.
Moreover, the policy stipulates that “[t]he insurer shall
not be liable for more than $29,507,000.00 for any one
occurrence, except as hereinafter provided.”. . .
....
. . . [T]he agreement between the parties remains
ambiguous as to whether the coverage for soft costs and
business income exceeded $100,000. Thus, it is for a jury
to consider the circumstances surrounding the
transaction to determine the scope and effect of the
144
policy between RLI and Highlands . . . .
The court determined that after applying standard rules of
construction—e.g., interpreting the contract as a whole and
construing ambiguities against the drafter—the agreement
145
remained ambiguous and a jury should resolve the issue.
As is
sometimes the case with these disputes, conflicting extrinsic
evidence was placed before the court with respect to what the
146
insured’s insurance agent knew about policy coverage.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 170.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 171–72 (alteration in original).
Id. at 172.
Id. See also Blis Day Spa, LLC v. Hartford Ins. Group, 427 F. Supp. 2d 621,
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K. Valuation Issues
Since 2001, a year has not gone by without at least one
published insurance decision issued in connection with the WTC
disaster. SR International Business Insurance Co. v. World Trade Center
Properties, LLC involved a dispute over the amount of property
insurance recoverable for tenant improvements affixed to the WTC
147
complex.
The parties’ disagreement focused on how to value
148
tenant improvements. The developer argued “the improvements
should be treated the same way as the buildings to which they were
attached—that is, like the WTC’s ‘core and shell,’ they should be
149
included in the replacement cost at their full appraised value.”
The insurers, noting that many of the tenants that occupied space
on September 11, 2001, terminated or abandoned their leases,
argued that the improvements cannot be valued at full replacement
150
Instead, the
cost because they will never be “replaced.”
improvements should be valued based upon “‘the unamortized
portion of the Port Authority’s original contribution to these
improvements,’ [which] they claim[ed] constitute[d] the limit of
151
the Insureds’ actual interest in the improvements.”
This valuation disagreement is the basic difference between
recovery under a “replacement cost” policy and recovery available
under an “actual cash value” policy. As the court explained:
Replacement cost policies provide greater coverage than
traditional “actual cash value” policies by permitting the
insured to replace damaged or destroyed property with
new property without any deduction. By paying an extra
premium for replacement cost coverage, the insured can
recover on a “new-forold” [sic] basis instead of the “oldfor-old” recovery provided by ACV [actual cash value]
coverage. However, in order to collect this larger amount,
the insured must actually replace the damaged property

630-31 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (finding the property policy ambiguous with respect to
whether it responds to advertising costs as language stated that insurer would
provide “necessary” extra expenses incurred during the period of restoration and
both parties disputed what were “necessary” expenses and the policy did not
define the term “necessary”).
147. 445 F. Supp. 2d 320, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
148. Id. at 326.
149. Id. at 331.
150. Id. at 331–32.
151. Id.
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consistent
with
the
RCE
[replacement
cost
152
endorsement].
The court did not accept the insurer’s argument that
153
Part of the court’s
replacement cost coverage was not available.
reasoning had to do with the jurisdiction and authority of the
154
appraisal panel responsible for valuing the losses. As is common
in property coverage disputes, the appraisal panel had limited
jurisdiction, namely, to determine the extent of the insured’s
155
These panels do not typically get involved in coverage
loss.
issues. Coverage determinations are for the court. In this case, the
court held that, although actual replacement is a condition
precedent to collecting replacement proceeds, it was not a
condition precedent to valuing hypothetical replacement costs,
156
Moreover,
which is all the appraisal panel was authorized to do.
the court was not convinced that, under the facts presented, the
157
improvements would never be replaced. While it is true that the
WTC was not going to be rebuilt, replacement is determined on a
“functional similarity” basis and against this backdrop it is possible
that the improvements will be replaced as the insureds have said
that they intend to construct a new office and retail complex that
158
will presumably include tenant improvements.
L. Mold-Related Losses
Coverage disputes over mold-related losses continued
unabated in 2005. In 40 Gardenville, L.L.C. v. Travelers Property
Casualty of America, the insured purchased a vacant building located
159
in West Seneca, New York.
Gardenville purchased an all-risk
160
Travelers’s underwriter
policy from Travelers for the property.
did not inspect the building before issuing the policy, which
161
contained a standard exclusion for “corrosion, rust or dampness.”
Representatives of the insured, however, did inspect the building

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 326 n.6 (alteration in original).
Id. at 332.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 333.
Id.
Id. at 334–35.
387 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 208.
Id.
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162

before purchasing the policy.
One testified that he “observed
leaks in the roof and large holes on the exterior walls, water
draining into buckets and leaking from the open valve of the
sprinkler system, puddles of standing water, and wet carpeting
163
He also “observed a substance
throughout the building.”
resembling dirt on the vinyl baseboards along the second floor that
164
he later learned was mold.”
Notwithstanding these observations,
the court ruled that neither the “fortuitous loss” doctrine nor its
counterpart, the “known loss” defense, operated to bar coverage at
165
the summary judgment stage.
While an insurer is not obligated
to pay out policy benefits to an insured who is aware of a loss before
it purchases the policy, in this case, while the insured certainly
knew the building was in rough shape, it could not be held, as a
matter of law, that the insured knew the property was contaminated
166
with mold.
Nevertheless, coverage did not exist because the
policy’s “dampness” exclusion applied:
[T]his Court finds the water or dampness present in the
building was the proximate cause of the mold
contamination. As such, the unambiguous language of
the policy excluding coverage for losses caused or
resulting from dampness applies to Plaintiff’s claim for
mold loss, and operates as a bar to Plaintiff’s recovery in
167
this matter.
Property policies usually include a mold exclusion. Water
168
Mold growth and
damage, however, is a common cause of loss.
water infiltration have a close causal tie, so a raging dispute exists in
the industry over whether property policies respond to mold losses
where water infiltration, a covered cause of loss, caused or
169
The debate is complicated by fairly
contributed to the mold.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 209.
165. Id. at 212.
166. See id. (reasoning that “[w]hile this admission certainly supports
Defendant’s position that mold existed in the building prior to the inception of
the policy, it does not compel the conclusion that Mr. Hickson was aware of the
mold contamination at that time.”).
167. Id. at 214.
168. See id. at 213 (citing expert testimony on water damage to buildings).
169. See, e.g., Atl. Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Lotz, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1304 (E.D. Wis.
2005) (holding contamination and deterioration exclusions contained in a
homeowner’s policy excluded coverage for mold and rot); Polk v. Landings of
Walden Condo. Ass’n, No. 2004-P-0075, 2005 WL 1862126, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App.
Aug. 5, 2005) (holding the mold exclusion in both policies eliminated coverage
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common exclusionary language that incorporates an “ensuing loss”
exception. The relevant language is as follows:
We do not cover loss caused by:
....
(2) rust, rot, mold or other fungi.
....
We do cover ensuing loss caused by collapse of the
building or any part of the building, water damage, or
breakage of glass which is part of the building if the loss
170
would otherwise be covered under this policy.
Courts go back and forth on whether this “ensuing loss”
language restores coverage for mold. Courts that found coverage
usually concluded that mold was an ensuing loss of water
171
Courts that found no coverage often did so on the
damage.
grounds that “ensuing loss” was loss that followed from some other
172
cause.
In other words, coverage applied only where the water
damage ensued from some other non-covered loss, such as mold.
The Texas Supreme Court resolved a long-running dispute within
the state over this issue by concluding that the ensuing loss
language did not restore coverage for mold loss:
To “ensue” means “to follow as a consequence or in
chronological succession; to result, as an ensuing
conclusion or effect.” An “ensuing loss,” then, is a loss
which follows as a consequence of some preceding event
for mold damage in a condominium). See also Bureau v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 129 F. App’x 927 (6th Cir. 2005) (permitting expert testimony that mold was
caused by improper maintenance of roof rather than by a particular storm event);
Qualls v. State Farm Lloyds, 226 F.R.D. 551, 558 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (requiring
expert testimony, under a Texas homeowner’s policy, to establish causation for a
mold claim allegedly stemming from a plumbing leak); Kemmerer v. State Farm
Ins. Cos., No. Civ.A. 01-5445, 2004 WL 87017 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2004) (requiring
expert testimony to establish that a specified peril, under homeowner’s policy,
caused the mold infestation). But see Garza v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, No. Civ.A.M04–270, 2005 WL 2388254, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2005) (holding mold damage
resulting from water leaks due to gradual roof deterioration was not a loss ensuing
from a covered event).
170. Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 746 (Tex. 2006).
171. See Garza, 2005 WL 2388254 at *2. “This Court has specifically held that
despite language in the Policy purportedly excluding coverage for mold damage,
the Policy covers mold damage to a dwelling or personal property that ensues from
an otherwise covered water damage event under the policy.” Id. (citation
omitted).
172. Id. (stating the “general mold exclusion in the Policy precludes coverage
for mold occurring naturally or resulting from a non-covered event.”).
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or circumstance. . . . If we give to the language of the
exception its ordinary meaning, we must conclude that an
ensuing loss caused by water damage is a loss caused by
water damage where the water damage itself is the result
173
of a preceding cause.
Of course, when a description of the “ordinary meaning” of
insurance language is as complex as the above quote, the courts,
not surprisingly scatter on this point. Moreover, the Texas
Supreme Court was split with Justices Medina and O’Neill
174
Others believe that neither party in Fiess had the
dissenting.
correct interpretation:
William J. Chriss, as amicus curiae, argues that neither
party has it right. Amicus submits that the Feisses [sic]
interpret water damage from the ensuing-loss provision
too broadly, essentially ignoring Lambros and reading
“ensuing” out of the provision. The amicus further argues
that State Farm’s circular interpretation of the provision
ignores the meaning of the word “otherwise,” thus
depriving the provision of virtually any meaning. Amicus
submits that the correct and more reasonable
construction of “otherwise be covered” is that it refers to
the remainder of the policy other than the paragraph
under consideration. Thus, according to the amicus,
water damage including mold, which results from an
excluded peril as Lambros requires, would be covered
because such loss is not excluded anywhere else in the
175
policy other than in paragraph f.
Thus, while the Texas Supreme Court apparently resolved the
issue in the Lone Star state, the debate will likely continue
176
elsewhere.
173. Fiess, 202 S.W.3d at 749 (quoting Lambros v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 530
S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975)).
174. Id. at 753 (Medina, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 756. The dissent also pointed out that the Texas Department of
Insurance read the “ensuing loss” language differently than the majority. Id. The
Texas Department of Insurance concluded that the “‘provision can only be read to
mean that despite any exclusion language, it includes coverage for certain
previously excluded damage which is caused by a covered water loss.’” Id.
176. See Souza v. Corvick, 441 F.2d 1013, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that
“earth sinking” exclusion did not exclude coverage for damage resulting from
subsidence caused by something other than natural soil conditions); New Zealand
Ins. v. Lenoff, 315 F.2d 95, 95–96 (9th Cir. 1963) (holding that “settling” exclusion
barred recovery for damage caused by house settling into soil unless immediate
cause of settling was an unanticipated event rather than an inevitable occurrence);
Church of the Palms-Presbyterian (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp.
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2d 1339, 1343 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that “fungus” exclusion excluded
coverage for mold damage where both parties agreed that mold was a fungus);
Cooper v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 184 F. Supp. 2d 960, 962 (D. Ariz. 2002)
(holding that ensuing loss provision does not reinsert coverage for excluded mold
damage even if proximately caused by covered water event, but reaffirms coverage
for secondary losses ultimately caused by excluded perils); Schloss v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., 54 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1094–95 (M.D. Ala. 1999), aff’d 211 F.3d 131 (11th
Cir. 2000) (holding that ensuing loss exception to “loss caused by rot” exclusion
did not restore coverage for cost of repairing insured’s rotted wood studs);
Vermont Elec. Power Co. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 72 F.
Supp. 2d 441, 445 (D. Vt. 1999) (holding that damage caused by design defect was
the “loss,” not an “ensuing loss,” and, thus, exclusion for “loss caused by faulty or
defective design” barred coverage); Banks v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 91–6982, 1993
WL 40113, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 1993) (barring recovery for ensuing loss
under a policy provision that expressly excluded original cause of the damage);
Ames Privilege Assoc. Ltd. P’ship v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 742 F. Supp. 704, 707 (D.
Mass. 1990) (holding that ensuing loss clause, which provided coverage for losses
caused by included perils, did not nullify the exclusion for wood rot); Murray v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 268 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
damages sustained as a result of a copper pipe leak were within deterioration
exclusion and ensuing loss provision did not obligate insurer to pay costs
associated with repairing the faulty pipe); Beach v. Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co.,
532 A.2d 1297, 1298 n. 1 (Conn. 1987) (holding that ensuing loss clause could be
understood to have contemplated coverage for a “collapse” that “ensues” from
excluded activity such as earth settling); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Branch, 234 So. 2d
396, 398 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that ensuing loss clause restored
coverage for cracks and fractures in house caused by blasting activities even
though policy excluded coverage for damage caused by “cracking” of foundations
and walls); Bd. of Educ. Of Maine Twp. High Sch. Dist. 207 v. Int’l Ins. Co., 684
N.E.2d 978, 984 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that presence of asbestos in building
was a “latent defect” within meaning of latent defect exclusion and ensuing loss
clause did not operate to restore coverage for loss or damage caused by asbestos);
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Warren, 675 S.W.2d 402, 403 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that exclusion for “water below the surface of the ground” did not refer to water
from melted ice which ran down side of insured’s house into ground next to
foundation); Shields v. Pa. Gen. Ins. Co., 488 So. 2d 1252, 1253 (La. Ct. App.
1986) (permitting recovery for structural damage ensuing from an instantaneous
rather than gradual collapse); Myers v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. C8–02–62,
2002 WL 1547673, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. July 16, 2002) (holding that ensuing loss
clause did not restore coverage for damage caused by expressly excluded mold);
Cantrell v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Mo., 876 S.W.2d 660, 662–
663 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that “contamination” exclusion did not exclude
coverage for damage caused by toxic smoke directly and necessarily resulting from
the covered fire); Weeks v. Co-Operative Ins. Cos., 817 A.2d 292, 296 (N.H. 2003)
(holding that negligent work exclusion barred coverage, even though the
exclusion contained an exception providing coverage if an excluded cause of loss
resulted in a covered cause of loss); Narob Dev. Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 631
N.Y.S.2d 155, 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (holding that ensuing loss exception did
not apply to loss directly related to excluded risk); Umanoff v. Nationwide Mut.
Fire Ins., 442 N.Y.S.2d 892, 893 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981) (permitting recovery for
damage to real property because insurer failed to establish that it would have been
unreasonable for the average person to conclude that raccoons were excluded
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M. E. coli Bacteria-Related Loss
In Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hardinger, homeowners fell
ill with respiratory infections and skin problems shortly after
177
moving into their new home.
Their property insurer arranged
for testing of the home and discovered that it was contaminated
178
with e. coli. After a number of unsuccessful attempts to clean the
property, the homeowners simply gave the property back to their
179
bank.
Their insurer notified them that it was denying coverage
on the theory that the loss predated the policy and was excluded by
180
the pollution exclusion.
The trial court agreed with the insurer
that, although the insureds gave up their home, they did not
181
establish a “physical loss to property.” The Third Circuit vacated
the district court’s ruling, analogizing the situation to cases where
an insured is denied the use of property because of asbestos
182
In Port Authority of New York & New Jersey v.
contamination.
“vermin”); Alwart v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 508 S.E.2d 531, 533–34 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1998) (holding that faulty workmanship exclusion applied to the cost of
repairing the ensuing loss, whether direct or indirect); Boughan v. Nationwide
Prop. & Cas. Co., No. 1–04–57, at *3 2005 WL 126781 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 24,
2005) (holding that ensuing loss clause did not restore coverage for losses caused
by a specifically excluded peril); Phillips v United Services Auto. Ass’n, 146 S.W.3d
629, 636 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that ensuing loss clause provided
coverage for losses caused by faulty workmanship provided that those losses were
not excluded from coverage); McDonald v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 837 P.2d
1000, 1003-04 (Wash. 1992) (holding that ensuing loss clause only applied to
losses ensuing from an uncovered event if those losses are covered perils);
Richland Valley Prod., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Cas. Co., 548 N.W.2d 127, 132-33
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that ensuing loss clause provided coverage for
direct loss resulting from excluded cause only if that loss would otherwise be
covered). Moreover, in jurisdictions which apply the efficient proximate cause
doctrine, coverage may be afforded for mold if it is determined that the efficient
proximate cause of the loss is a covered “cause of loss” such as water infiltration.
See Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Maples, 309 F.3d 1068, 1071 (8th Cir. 2002) (applying
Arkansas law, mold exclusion may not apply where mold was caused by a burst
frozen pipe, which is a covered peril, and policy language negating the efficient
cause doctrine did not apply to mold exclusion); Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 770 P.2d 704, 707–08 (Cal. 1989) (holding that coverage should be denied
where the efficient proximate cause of loss is an excluded peril); Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Hirschmann, 773 P.2d 413, 416 (Wash. 1999) (holding that if the efficient
proximate cause of loss is a covered peril, then there would be coverage regardless
of whether subsequent events within the chain of causation are excluded).
177. 131 F. App’x 823 (3d Cir. 2005).
178. Id. at 824.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 825.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 826.
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Affiliated FM Insurance Co., the Third Circuit remanded to the trial
court for determination of whether the pollution exclusion
183
applied.
In a concurring opinion to Motorists Mutual Insurance,
however, Justice Thomas L. Ambro opined that the exclusion was
likely ambiguous under the facts of this case, and predicted that the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would likely follow the Arizona
precedent of Keggi v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Insurance Co.,
which found that a pollution exclusion did not apply to bacteria184
related injury.
N. Policy Exclusions
1.

Faulty Workmanship and Design Exclusion

Most property policies contain workmanship exclusions. One
such exclusion was found to be ambiguous in Otis Elevator Co. v.
185
The insured entered into a contract
Factory Mutual Insurance Co.
with the Metropolitan Airport Commission (MAC) to build an
Automated People-Mover (APM) along the length of the new “C”
186
During the
Concourse at the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport.
187
testing of the APM, the tram crashed at the end of the tracks.
The resulting damage to the tram, the buffer, and the terminal wall
188
created repair costs of $2 million. In addition to these costs, Otis
also paid $1.5 million worth of liquidated damages to MAC because
189
of the delay in completing the project. Otis sought to recover its
190
losses from the builder’s risk policy purchased by the MAC. The
insurer denied coverage based on a policy exclusion that read:
This Policy excludes the following, but if physical damage
not excluded by this Policy results, then only that resulting
damage is insured:
1) faulty workmanship, material, construction or design
from any cause.
2) loss or damage to stock or material attributable to
183. 311 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying New York and New Jersey law).
184. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 131 F. App’x at 826 (Ambro, J., concurring); Keggi
v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 13 P.3d 785, 791 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
185. 353 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D. Conn. 2005).
186. Id. at 276.
187. Id. at 277.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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manufacturing or processing operations while such stock
or material is being processed, manufactured, tested, or
191
otherwise worked on.
The accident occurred because one of the insured’s
subcontractors deviated from test protocol by failing to engage the
192
secondary brakes while operating the tram. The insurer claimed
that this failure amounted to “faulty workmanship” excluded under
193
the builder’s risk policy.
The court disagreed, finding that the
term “faulty workmanship” did not encompass a breach of the
testing protocol:
[T]he term “faulty workmanship” does not encompass the
The tram itself was not faulty
damage at issue.
workmanship in the sense of a “flawed product” because it
already had been completed at the time of the accident.
The tram was not a “flawed process” because the
construction of the tram already was complete, even if it
had not actually been accepted by MAC, at the time of the
accident. By either definition of “faulty workmanship,”
defendant’s claim that the tram is faulty workmanship
when sent at full speed, overloaded and without brakes, is
forced. The accidental property damage to the tram
cannot be termed “faulty workmanship.” It is simply
accidental damage resulting from subcontractor
negligence unrelated to the quality of any product or
194
process.
The court also determined that the testing exclusion did not
apply because the tram cars could not be considered “stock,” as
195
that term is used in the exclusion.
Stock is kept as inventory for
use or sale to customers; the trams were custom-manufactured and
196
installed as part of the airport’s APM system.
Moreover, the
trams were not “material” as used in the exclusion, “A tram is the
complete machine and cannot be considered a component of
197
itself; thus, it cannot be ‘material.’”
191. Id. at 278.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 281.
195. Id. at 283.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 283. See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 929 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1991)
(distinguishing between “flawed product” and “flawed process,” finding that faulty
workmanship only applies to the former); City of Burlington v. Hartford Steam
Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 190 F. Supp. 2d 663, 672 (D. Vt. 2002) (holding that
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The faulty workmanship exclusion was successful in
198
In Andray, an insured
eliminating coverage in Andray v. Elling.
homeowner decided to make some electrical, plumbing, and
199
structural changes to his new home.
Unfortunately, he hired
contractors who did not perform the work particularly well and the
homeowner was required to hire other contractors to correct the
200
resulting problems. When the homeowner turned the claim over
to his homeowner’s insurance carrier, the claim was denied on the
grounds that faulty workmanship was not covered under the
201
policy.
The insured sought to avoid this exclusion by claiming
that a concurrent covered cause, namely the contractors’ acts of
202
vandalism, contributed to the loss. The court rejected this theory
on the ground that no evidence existed to prove the damages were
203
anything more than the result of incompetence.
Property policies often exclude poor workmanship or design
from the group of otherwise covered “causes of loss.” In E.L.
Rincon Supportive Services Organization, Inc. v. First Nonprofit Mutual
Insurance Co., the court considered whether “excavation” activities
204
fell within an exclusion for faulty “construction.” The insured’s
205
Rather, excavation
property was not under construction.
activities on the adjacent property caused damage to the insured’s
206
property.
After consulting a number of dictionaries, which did
not on their face appear to settle the issue, the court invoked the
“reasonable person” analysis:

“faulty workmanship” cannot be read to encompass “accidental damage to the
product caused by the builder’s negligence during construction”); M.A.
Mortenson Co. v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. Civ.98-2319/RHK/JMM, 1999
WL 33911358 (D. Minn. Dec. 23, 1999) (noting the difference between “flawed
product” and “flawed process”); Kroll Constr. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 594 F.
Supp. 304, 308 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (holding that deficiencies in subcontractor’s
waterproofing materials and/or work requiring costly corrections by general
contractor were captured by exclusion); Schultz v. Erie Ins. Group, 754 N.E.2d
971, 976--77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (finding term “faulty workmanship”
unambiguous and signifying “at the very least . . . a component of the building
process leading up to the finished product”).
198. No. L-04-1150, 2005 WL 567035 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2005).
199. Id. at *1.
200. Id. at *1–2.
201. Id. at *3.
202. Id. at *4.
203. Id. at *5.
204. 803 N.E.2d 532 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
205. Id. at 534.
206. Id.
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Based on the plain, ordinary meaning of the term
“construction,” we conclude that a reasonable person
would consider the construction process to encompass
excavation activities.
For instance, it is commonly
understood that excavating activities are necessary to lay
the foundation in the construction of a building. Since
we conclude that the term “construction” includes
excavation activities, the property damage resulting from
the construction excavation operations on the adjacent
207
property is excluded under the policy.
In another case, a builders’ risk policy did not respond to
208
damage to wood siding as a result of this exclusion.
2.

Ensuing loss exception

In National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Texpak
Group, N.V., the faulty workmanship exclusion applied where
insureds sought coverage for business interruption and extra
expense losses due to a contractor’s defective design and
209
installation of upgrades to a paper mill.
The insureds argued
that their business interruption and extra expense costs fell within
the “ensuing loss exception” to the faulty workmanship/design
210
Under this exception, the policy does not respond to
exclusion.
costs of making good defective designer specifications, “this
exclusion shall not apply to loss or damage resulting from such
211
The policy, however,
defective design or specifications . . . .”
expressly dealt with business interruption and extra expense losses,
stating that these damages were covered when “resulting from loss
207. Id. at 538. See also Nat’l Hous. Bldg. Corp. v. Acordia of Va. Ins. Agency,
Inc., 591 S.E.2d 88, 91 (Va. 2004) (holding that the design exclusion operated to
bar coverage for defectively designed retaining wall that failed, and that the
policy’s “Duties in the Event of Loss” provision requiring the insured to take steps
to protect the covered property from further damage, i.e., fix the retaining wall,
did not provide relief as such duties—and the insurer’s responsibility to reimburse
the insured to fulfill these duties—is not triggered unless there is a covered loss).
208. Carney v. Assurance Co. of Am., 177 F. App’x 282, 283 (4th Cir. 2006)
(“[T]he policy unambiguously excludes coverage for the damage at issue because
it was caused by or resulted from faulty workmanship in the failure to properly
stain and protect the wood.”). See also Elworthy v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 166
F. App’x 353 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that damage to homeowner’s floors fell
within policy exclusion for damage caused by faulty, inadequate, or defective
materials used in repair, construction, renovation or remodeling).
209. 906 So. 2d 300, 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
210. Id.
211. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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212

. . . covered herein . . . to real or personal property . . . .” As the
court noted:
Under the clear and unambiguous terms of this policy,
business interruption and extra expense losses are
covered only if “resulting from” damage or destruction of
real or personal property caused by a covered peril. Since
defective design or specifications are not perils covered by
this policy, economic damage or loss resulting from these
213
causes are excluded from coverage as well.
A California federal decision discussed at some length the
“ensuing loss” language found in many faulty workmanship
exclusions. In Sapiro v. Encompass Insurance, the exclusion in
question excluded from “building losses incident to . . . inadequate
214
However, the exclusion also
or defective . . . workmanship.”
215
stated “any ensuing loss not excluded or excepted . . . is covered.”
In this case, the insured’s home was damaged due to water
infiltration and mold growth due to a defective exterior stucco
216
job. The court found that the faulty workmanship exclusion
unambiguously excluded the loss notwithstanding the “ensuing
loss” provision:
California’s courts have long defined an “ensuing loss”
as a loss “separate” and “independent” from [an] original
peril. Plaintiffs’ losses are neither; they are, rather,
abstrusely phrased reformations of the same “gap”-related
losses-losses plaintiffs concede are excluded by Safeco’s
“faulty workmanship” clause.
In fact, none of the
supposedly “ensuing losses” plaintiffs identify can be
212. Id. at 302.
213. Id. See also GTE Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 598, 616 (3d
Cir. 2004) (observing that insured could not “recover for just any ensuing or
resulting business loss–the underlying peril resulting in business interruption must
be covered.”); Caren Carney v. Assurance Co. of Am., No. Civ. JFM-04-3434, 2005
WL 899843, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 19, 2005) (finding no coverage under builder’s risk
policy for damages resulting from siding that was properly installed but damaged
by use of improper preservative); Montefiore Med. Ctr v. Am. Prot. Ins. Co., 226 F.
Supp. 2d 470, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“An ensuing loss provision does not cover loss
caused by the excluded peril, but rather covers loss caused to other property
wholly separate from the defective property itself.”); Laquila Const., Inc. v.
Travelers Indemnity Co. of Ill., 66 F. Supp. 2d 543, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Swire Pac.
Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So. 2d 161, 167–68 (Fla. 2003) (ensuing-loss
exception not applicable if the ensuing loss directly related to the original
excluded risk).
214. 221 F.R.D. 513, 521 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
215. Id. at 522.
216. Id.
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categorized as “ensuing losses,” if even losses at all.
Plaintiffs’ alleged “moisture” and “fungal” losses are
directly attributable to the initial negligent contracting.
Plaintiffs’ “reconstruction” costs are neither separate nor
“ensuing” by any legitimate measure; they are the price
217
for repairing the predicate damage.
3.

Freeze/Thaw or Pressure/Weight of Water Exclusion

Another exclusion typically found in property policies involves
damage caused by “freezing, thawing, pressure or weight of water
or ice . . . .” This exclusion sometimes operates to bar coverage for
218
a partial collapse due to snow load.
4.

Latent Defect Exclusion

A common property insurance exclusion pertains to “latent
defects.” This exclusion applied in Walker v. McKinnis, where the
insureds’ home was damaged when water intruded into the
basement during heavy rains because of the geometry of the
219
In applying the latent defect
home’s roof and gutter system.
exclusion, the court reasoned:
The policy does not define “latent defect.” Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary defines the adjective,
“latent” as follows: “existing in hidden, dormant, or
repressed form, but usually capable of being evoked,
expressed, or brought to light; existing in posse; not
manifest; potential.”
The report of appellants’ expert, an architect, stated
that the water intrusion was caused by “the geometry of
the roof and gutter system.” According to the expert,
“[t]he vector of the roof valleys directs roof run off along
the main A-frame gutters where there is no down spout
outlet.” The expert stated in his report that during “very
heavy rain events,” water overflowed from the gutters onto
the ground and eventually into the basement through a
window well. Appellants did not hire anyone to
independently inspect the house prior to taking

217. Id.
218. See Wurst v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 431 F. Supp. 2d 501, 505–06
(D.N.J. 2006).
219. No. CA2004-10-082, 2005 WL 1864144, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 8,
2005).
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occupancy. However, appellant, Christopher Walker,
stated in an affidavit contained in the record that the
house “did not have any visible defects” when he
purchased it.
Based on the above facts and our review of the entire
record, we find no error in the common pleas court’s
determination that the defect in the “geometry of the roof
and gutter system” was a “latent defect,” and that it caused
the water intrusion and subsequent damage. Consistent
with the ordinary meaning of “latent,” the defect in the
roof and gutter system “existed in hidden form” and was
“not manifest” at the time appellants purchased the
property and entered into the contract with West
220
American.
5.

Surface Water Exclusion

Property policies often contain exclusions for loss caused by
surface water runoff. In State ex rel. State Fire & Tornado Fund of
North Dakota Insurance Department v. North Dakota State University, the
university’s heating plant suffered damage when large amounts of
rain water, which had collected on an adjacent sports facility site,
221
The university’s
entered the plant through a steam tunnel.
property insurance carriers denied coverage on grounds that the
water damage was excluded by the flood and surface water
222
In agreeing with the insurers, the court
exclusions.
acknowledged the difficulty of applying the “surface water”
223
exclusion to a particular factual setting.
The court determined
that the exclusion applied even though the “surface water” was
220. Id. at *1–2.
221. 694 N.W.2d 225, 227–28 (N.D. 2005).
222. Id. at 228.
223. Id. at 230, 235. See also Heller v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 800 P.2d 1006, 1009
(Colo. 1990) (explaining that the exclusion did not preclude coverage where
water originated from natural runoff of melted snow, but was diverted into manmade trenches which were “defined channels” that prevented percolation,
evaporation, or natural drainage); Smith v. Union Auto Indem. Co., 752 N.E.2d
1261, 1266–67 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (reasoning that the exclusion precluded
coverage where rainwater filled homeowner’s basement, notwithstanding the fact
that the flow was altered by such manmade objects as streets and other paved
surfaces); State Farm Lloyds v. Marchetti, 962 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex. App. 1997)
(noting that the exclusion did not preclude coverage for damage caused by
sewerage backup after heavy rain, as the loss was proximately caused by sewage
which was non-floodwater, even though the sewage invaded the home due to
floodwater).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007

41

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 3
6. O'CONNOR - ADC.DOC

218

12/15/2007 3:08:53 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1

224

diverted underground through a steam tunnel.
The water was
merely following gravity and did not change its essential nature by
225
flowing through an underground steam tunnel.
6.

Rust and Corrosion Exclusion

Another common property policy exclusion pertains to
damages caused by rust and corrosion. The exclusion applied in
Gilbane Building Co. v. Altman Co., where Gilbane was hired as the
226
Gilbane
construction manager on a new manufacturing plant.
227
hired Altman to provide cast-in-place concrete for the building.
The contract called for Altman to “etch” the concrete floor, which
essentially involved removing the concrete agents used to cure the
concrete floor and to rough the surface of the floor so that it could
228
The method selected to perform the
receive the final sealant.
etching process was to use a muriatic acid product called E-Z
229
Muriatic Acid.
Apparently, the process caused the stainless steel
hardware, switch plates, and copper piping throughout the
230
building to discolor.
In contesting the application of the “rust
and corrosion” exclusion, Altman claimed that, while the
discoloration was due to rust and corrosion, the court should apply
the common sense and ordinary understanding of the terms “rust”
and “corrosion” and conclude that a fast-acting, acid-based
chemical reaction, is not the type of rust and corrosion intended to
231
The court did not find Altman’s
be excluded under the policy.
argument persuasive:
The ACE policy bars coverage for loss resulting from
rust and corrosion. The policy does not qualify this
exclusion to cover only gradual-forming rust and
corrosion or fast-forming rust and corrosion. The parties
have stipulated that the loss at issue here was due to
corrosion and rust on the metal surfaces of the equipment
224. State ex rel. State Fire & Tornado Fund, 694 N.W.2d at 232.
225. Id. at 233. See also Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Hicks Thomas & Lilienstern,
L.L.P., 174 S.W.3d 254, 258 (Tex. App. 2004) (concluding that the exclusion
applied where heavy rains from a tropical storm caused a bayou to overflow its
banks causing floodwater to flow into man-made underground structures causing
damage to a law firm’s office).
226. No. 04AP–664, 2005 WL 534906, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2005).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at *3.
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and piping in the electrical/mechanical rooms and the
UPS rooms in which the etching was performed.
Therefore, this court finds that the “rust and corrosion”
232
exclusion in the policy provided by ACE bars coverage.
7.

Earth Movement Exclusion

Many property policies contain an earth movement exclusion.
On occasion, the exclusion is also found in CGL policies. In Hoang
v. Monterra Homes (Powderhorn) LLC, the CGL policy in question
excluded coverage for property damage “arising out of, caused by,
resulting from, contributed to, aggravated by, or related to
earthquake, landslide, mud flow, subsidence, settling, slipping,
falling away, shrinking, expansion, caving in, shifting, eroding,
233
rising, tilting or any other movement of land, earth or mud.”
The insured claimed that the exclusion did not apply to movement
234
of “artificial fill.” In this case, a number of newly built residences
were damaged because of soil problems and expansion of the
235
artificial fill placed under the homes’ foundations. The Colorado
Court of Appeals rejected this interpretation of the exclusion
because the policy language did not admit a distinction between
natural and artificial causes, and to create one would rewrite policy
236
language.
As a general rule, this exclusion is intended to eliminate
coverage for earthquake damage, sink holes, and other earth

232. Id. at *5. See also Cent. Int’l Co. v. Kemper Nat’l Ins. Cos., 202 F.3d 372
(1st Cir. 2000) (holding that the exclusion applied to coils that corroded during
overseas shipping); Bettigole v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 567 N.E.2d 1259 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1991) (holding that the exclusion applied to damages caused by de-icing
salts used on a parking deck); S.W. Energy Corp. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 974 P.2d 1239
(Utah 1999) (holding that the exclusion applied to damages caused by rust and
corrosion in an oil tank).
233. 129 P.3d 1028, 1035 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005), rev’d, 149 P.3d 798 (Colo.
2007). The Colorado Supreme Court reversed on the issue of whether the
insurance proceeds covering the builder’s liability are available to a subsequent
purchaser, holding “the proceeds of the CGL insurance policy at issue in this case
are available through garnishment to satisfy the judgment of a subsequent
purchaser . . . . ” Hoang, 149 P.3d at 801.
234. Hoang, 129 P.3d at 1035–36.
235. Id. at 1032, 1035–36. The district court “found that the damage here was
caused by water pressure associated with clay soils and the fill materials underlying
the homes.” Id. at 1036.
236. Id. at 1036. The court stated, “Colorado courts, however, have refused to
rewrite policies to create a distinction between natural and artificial causes where
no language in the policy supports such a distinction.” Id.
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movement caused by natural phenomena. In Travelers Personal
Security Insurance Co. v. McClelland, an examination of the
concurrent causation doctrine was undertaken in the context of
237
damages to a home from movement of the foundation.
Under
Texas law, if the insurer pleads an exclusion, the insureds are
obligated to introduce evidence sufficient to prove that the damage
was caused solely by a covered risk or sufficient to allow a jury to
segregate the damage caused by the insured peril from that caused
238
by the excluded peril. The McClelland court upheld a jury verdict
in favor of the insureds, finding that expert testimony to the effect
that eighty percent of the foundation damage was caused by
plumbing leaks was sufficient for a jury to render a verdict in favor
239
of the homeowners.
8.

Vacancy Exclusion

Many property policies contain a vacancy exclusion. In
general terms, this exclusion eliminates coverage if a building is
vacant for a certain number of consecutive days prior to the
occurrence resulting in the loss or damage. A common exception
to the vacancy exclusion pertains to buildings under construction.
The California Court of Appeal, in TRB Investments, Inc. v. Firemen’s
Fund Insurance Co., ruled that the “under construction” exception
applies to a building that is being built and is not yet ready for
240
occupancy. The exception, however, did not apply to completed
commercial buildings that are ready for occupancy, but being
241
It is unclear
renovated to meet the needs of a particular tenant.
why the court found “renovation” to be sufficiently different from
“construction” so as to evade the exception’s grasp. The court
relied on dictionary definitions and, not surprisingly, found that
242
the term “construction” is not equivalent to “renovation.”
Yet,
from a functional viewpoint, little significant difference exists
between constructing a building and undertaking a major
237. 189 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. App. 2006).
238. Id. at 849 (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160, 162
(Tex. 1971)).
239. 189 S.W.3d at 851–52. See also Hudson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 809 N.Y.S.2d
124 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (holding that subsidence damage to plaintiff’s home
from a plumbing pipe leak was not excluded by insurance policy’s earth
movement or collapse exclusion).
240. 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 384 (Ct. App. 2005), rev’d, 145 P.3d 472 (Cal. 2006).
241. TRB Investments, Inc., 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 392.
242. Id. at 391.
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renovation. In either case, it is not possible to occupy the structure
243
while the activities are taking place.
The case was appealed and the “under construction”
exception was the focus of the California Supreme Court’s 2006
244
decision in TRB Investments, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. In
a matter of first impression, the highest court of California
examined whether the “under construction” exception to the
vacancy exclusion was limited to the erection of a new structure or
whether it extended to all building endeavors, no matter if they
were classified as new construction, renovations, or additions, all of
which required the substantial and continuing presence of workers
245
at the premises. In reversing the Court of Appeal, the California
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the insured:
The Court of Appeal’s focus upon whether the term
“under construction” encompasses only the erection of
new structures or also includes renovations thus fails to
take into account the rationales underlying the vacancy
exclusion and the construction exception. We believe the
proper inquiry for determining whether a building is
“under construction” for purposes of defining an
exception to the vacancy exclusion is whether the
building project, however characterized, results in
“substantial continuing activities” by persons associated
with the project at the premises during the relevant time
period. Under that test, “sporadic entry” would be
insufficient to find a substantial continuing presence of
workers required for a finding of “construction.” We
believe this test better serves the purposes underlying the
vacancy exclusion and more accurately reflects the
reasonable expectations of an insured than any test
turning
upon
technical
distinctions
between
“construction” on the one hand and “renovation” or
“remodeling” on the other.
Defendant contends the building here was not “under
construction” because, at the time of the loss, contractors
were engaged in only “preparatory” activities in
243. See Warren Davis Properties V, L.L.C. v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 111
S.W.3d 515, 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (stating
that
construction
includes
renovation).
244. 145 P.3d 472 (Cal. 2006).
245. Id. at 473–74.
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contemplation
of
future
construction.
The
characterization of the activities here as “preparatory” is
no more helpful than characterizing the building
endeavor as a “renovation” or remodeling.” Whether the
construction activity at issue is performed in
contemplation of, or in preparation for, a building
endeavor of even greater scope involving more workers is
beside the point. The question remains the same no
matter what stage of a construction project is at issue, i.e.,
are there “substantial continuing activities” on the
premises by those involved in the construction
246
endeavor?
9.

Non-Permanent Property Exclusion

In Ajax Building Corp. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., damage to a
crane was not covered as the policy contained an exclusion for
“equipment or other property which will not become a permanent
247
part of the structure(s) . . . .”
10. Vandalism Exclusion
In American States Insurance Co. v. Rancho San Marcos Properties,
LLC, a “vandalism” exclusion did not operate to exclude arson
248
damages.
11. Law and Ordinance Exclusion
Many property policies contain an exclusion or restrictive
endorsement that eliminates coverage for certain losses sustained
by an insured to comply with building codes and other regulatory
requirements. The exclusion has been held not to restrict recovery
for increased costs of replacing a damaged structure due to new or
more stringent code requirements where the cause of loss is
249
More agreement seems to exist that the
otherwise covered.
exclusion bars recovery where the insured seeks recovery for the
costs of having to upgrade undamaged portions of a structure due
246. Id. at 478–79 (citations omitted).
247. 358 F.3d 795, 798 (11th Cir. 2004).
248. 97 P.3d 775 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
249. See Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 617, 636 (Ct. App.
2004) (stating that the exclusion operates to defeat coverage only if the cause of
loss is an ordinance or law).
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to regulatory requirements triggered because of the need to repair
250
the damaged portions. The Third Circuit’s decision in Regents of
the Mercersburg College v. Republic Franklin Insurance Co. is a twist on
251
the more common coverage question presented by this exclusion.
In Mercersburg, the property policy contained an ordinance and law
252
endorsement that actually expanded coverage. The endorsement
read:
1. Coverage A—Coverage For Loss to the Undamaged
Portion of the Building. If a Covered Cause of Loss
occurs to covered Building property[,] . . . we will pay for
loss to the undamaged portion of the building caused by
enforcement of any ordinance or law that: (a) requires
demolition of parts of the same property not damaged by
a Covered Cause of Loss; (b) regulates the construction or
repair of buildings, or establishes zoning or land use
requirements at the described premises; and (c) is in
force at the time of the loss.
....
3. Coverage C—Increased Cost of Construction
Coverage. If a Covered Cause of Loss occurs to covered
Building property[,] . . . we will pay for the increased cost
to repair, rebuild or construct the property caused by
enforcement of building, zoning or land use ordinance or
law. If the property is repaired or rebuilt, it must be
intended for similar occupancy as the current property,
unless otherwise required by zoning or land use
253
ordinance or law.
The college claimed that the insurer was responsible for
upgrades to the undamaged portions of the building to bring them
into compliance with the International Mechanical Code, the
254
National Electrical Code, and the International Plumbing Code.
The Borough of Mercersburg, however, did not adopt any of those
255
building codes. Therefore, the question became whether the law
and ordinance endorsement was triggered under these

250. See Chattanooga Bank Assocs. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 301 F.
Supp. 2d 774, 779–80 (E.D. Tenn. 2004).
251. 458 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2006).
252. Id. at 162.
253. Id. (alterations in original).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 163.
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256

circumstances.
The Third Circuit ruled against the college,
finding that the “loss of undamaged portions” was not “caused by
enforcement of any” of the codes:
Unlike the [Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)] and
[Pennsylvania Handicapped Act (PHA)], Mercersburg
fails to point out any provisions of the building codes that
mandated or required it to do any upgrades, renovations,
etc., to the undamaged portions of Keil Hall. Certainly,
Mercersburg’s discretionary decision to renovate
undamaged portions of Keil Hall triggered the
application of the building codes as to that renovation,
but critically important is that the building codes
themselves did not trigger those renovations.
This
distinguishes Mercersburg’s building codes claims from its
ADA and PHA claims. As a result, we affirm the District
Court’s determination (albeit on different grounds than
the District Court) that the Ordinance and Law
Endorsement does not provide coverage for renovations it
made to undamaged portions of Keil Hall in hypothetical
compliance
with
codes
not
mandating
those
257
renovations.
A common rendition of this exclusion eliminates coverage for
loss caused by the “enforcement of any ordinance or law regulating
construction, repair or demolition of a building or other structure,
258
The California Court of Appeal,
unless endorsed to this policy.”
in Fire Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court, ruled that this exclusion
does not restrict recovery for the increased costs of replacing a
damaged structure due to new or more stringent building code
259
requirements where the cause of loss is otherwise covered.
Instead, the exclusion operates to defeat coverage if the cause of
260
the loss is an ordinance or law.
256. Id. at 172.
257. Id. (first alteration in original).
258. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 617, 627 (Ct. App.
2004).
259. 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 617, 629 (Ct. App. 2004).
260. Id. at 632. Quoting the Alaska Supreme Court, the California court
noted:
As we read this provision, it does not limit [the insurance company’s]
obligation for the cost of repair or replacement of the building when a
loss has occurred that is covered by the policy, but merely states that if
the loss itself is caused by an ordinance or law, there is no coverage. For
instance, if some safety improvement of a building to which no other loss
had occurred were required by an ordinance or law, [the insurance
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12. Water Without Roof Damage Exclusion
Some property policies contain a limitation that excludes
damage to the building’s contents due to rain, snow, or sleet unless
the building structure first sustains damage by a covered cause of
loss to its roof or walls through which the rain, snow, or sleet
entered. The meaning of this exclusion was examined in a
situation where renovations to an apartment were stalled due to
261
regulatory problems. At the time renovation ceased, the roof was
262
completely removed and a series of tarps covered the structure.
Due to high winds, rainwater penetrated the tarps causing
263
damage. The court determined that the temporary tarp structure
was not a “roof” within the meaning of the policy provision
permitting coverage for rain damage to interior contents where the
264
roof sustained damage.
13. Rotting Exclusion
Common exclusionary language bars coverage for damage due
to “rotting.” In Topor v. Erie Insurance Co., an insured’s building
parapet collapsed because of rotting mortar joints in the brick

company] would not be liable. However, when the cost of repairing or
replacing a building that had been damaged by fire is increased by the
requirements of an ordinance or a law, [the insurance company] is not
relieved of that cost.
Id. at 632–33 (quoting Bering Strait Sch. Dist. v. RLI Ins., 873 P.2d 1292, 1296
(Alaska 1994) and Garnett v. Transamerica Ins. Servs., 800 P.2d 656, 666 (Idaho
1990)) (alterations in original). See also Dupre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 62 P.3d 1024,
1029–30 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002); Farmer’s Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Oakland, 825 P.2d
554, 555 (Mont. 1992); Commonwealth Ins. Co. of Am. v. Grays Harbor County,
84 P.3d 304, 308 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (finding where Commonwealth drafted
the policy “in broad terms, covering reconstruction of undamaged parts of the facility if
required by enforcement of a law or ordinance,” and where other limitations were
not included, any ambiguity in Commonwealth’s language is construed in favor of
coverage because Commonwealth could have limited the coverage or written
other restrictions). But see Chattanooga Bank Ass’n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Md., 301 F. Supp. 2d 774, 779 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (agreeing with Fidelity that “it is
not liable for the cost of upgrading code violations which were discovered in areas
not affected by the fires” under the “Demolition and increased cost of
construction” clause, and that “discovery of code violations in non fire affected
areas, even when the inspection would not have taken place in the absence of
fires, fails to create liability under the terms of the insurance contract”).
261. Aginsky v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1231 (D. Or. 2005).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1234–36.
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265

wall.
The court determined that the rotting exclusion did not
apply because it was limited to the rotting of organic materials such
266
as wood.
O. Mixed Causation: The Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine
While courts take the same basic interpretive approach to
exclusions, regardless of whether they are contained in first-party
(property insurance) or third-party (liability insurance) policies,
differences exist. Many of the exclusions contained in property
policies are tailored around specific “causes of loss” or “named
perils.” Flood, surface water, landslide, weather conditions, and
earth movement are common “causes of loss” exclusions. Where a
loss is the result of a confluence of events, i.e., the interaction of
more than one “cause of loss,” some of which fall within coverage
and others not, a coverage dilemma can arise. Some jurisdictions
deal with this situation by applying what has come to be known as
the “efficient proximate cause” doctrine:
The efficient proximate cause doctrine is the universal
method for resolving coverage issues involving the
occurrence of covered and excluded perils. The efficient
proximate cause is not necessarily the last act in the chain
of events, nor necessarily is it the triggering cause, and the
efficient proximate cause looks to the quality of the links
and the chain of causation and is considered the
267
predominating cause of the loss.
Nevertheless, an insured cannot bring an otherwise uncovered
event into coverage merely by recharacterizing the cause of loss by
268
breaking it down into its various constituents.
The Washington
Supreme Court explained this principle:
The efficient proximate cause rule applies only where two
or more independent forces operate to cause the loss.
When, however, the evidence shows the loss was in fact
occasioned by only a single cause, albeit one susceptible to
various characterizations, the efficient proximate cause
analysis has no application. An insured may not avoid a
contractual exclusion merely by affixing an additional
265. 816 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (App. Div. 2006).
266. Id. at 633.
267. State ex rel. State Fire & Tornado Fund of North Dakota Ins. Dept. v.
North Dakota State Univ., 694 N.W.2d 225, 234 (N.D. 2005) (citations
omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
268. Kish v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 883 P.2d 308, 311 (Wash. 1994).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss1/3

50

O'Connor: Recent Issues in Property Coverage
6. O'CONNOR - ADC.DOC

2007]

12/15/2007 3:08:53 PM

RECENT ISSUES IN PROPERTY COVERAGE

227

label or separate characterization to the act or event
269
causing the loss.
Insurers have attempted to avoid the “efficient proximate
cause” doctrine by adopting policy language designed to
circumvent the doctrine. A common approach, implicated in
Howell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., was to draft an introductory
clause to the exclusion section of the policy stating that the policy
does not provide coverage if the loss would not have occurred in
the absence of the excluded loss, regardless of whether “other
causes acted concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded
270
In jurisdictions where the
event to produce the loss . . . .”
doctrine is grounded in public policy concerns, this introductory
271
language proved ineffective.
To avoid this result, some insurers
began drafting multiple cause exclusions designed to avoid
disputes over whether the efficient proximate cause or
predominant cause was a covered or an excluded peril. Instead,
these exclusions preclude coverage resulting from a combination
of specified causes regardless of whether one of the specified
causes is a remote cause of loss. The California Supreme Court
enforced such a multiple-cause exclusion in Julian v. Hartford
272
Underwriters Insurance Co.
The exclusion in question precluded
coverage for losses caused by weather conditions that “contribute in
any way with” an excluded cause or event such as earth movement,
273
Because the policy was an “all-risk” form,
including a landslide.
most weather conditions were covered causes of loss and damages

269. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Pieper
v. Commercial Underwriters Ins. Co., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 551, 558 (Ct. App. 1997)
(finding arson and brush fire were not separate and distinct perils that caused
loss); See also Pieper v. Commercial Underwriters Ins. Co., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 551, 558
(Ct. App. 1997) (determining arson and brush fire were not separate and distinct
perils that caused loss); Chadwick v. Fire Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 874 (Ct.
App. 1993) (stating builder’s negligence and defective framing were not separate
perils, because “[t]o say builder negligence ‘caused’ the defective framing is, in
this context, to indulge in misleading wordplay”).
270. See Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 708, 715 (Ct. App.
1990).
271. Id. at 715 n.6 (“If we were to give full effect to the State Farm policy
language excluding coverage whenever an excluded peril is a contributing or
aggravating factor in the loss, we would be giving insurance companies carte
blanche to deny coverage in nearly all cases. . . . Since, in most instances, an
insurer can point to some arguably excluded contributing factor, this rule would
effectively transform an ‘all-risk’ policy into a ‘no-risk’ policy.”)
272. 110 P.3d 903 (Cal. 2005).
273. Id. at 904.
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proximately caused by them fell within coverage.
Yet, the
weather conditions exclusion operated in such a way that, if any
specific excluded cause of loss “contributes in any way” along with
weather conditions, even if the weather conditions were the
275
In Julian,
efficient proximate cause of loss, no coverage exists.
heavy rains caused a slope to fall above the insured’s home,
triggering a landslide that caused a tree to crash into the insured’s
276
home.
California has statutorily adopted the efficient proximate cause
277
The weather conditions clause in Julian was not in
doctrine.
278
conflict with the statute. The statute did not preclude an insurer
from excluding some manifestations of weather conditions, but not
279
others.
Nevertheless, where the excluded peril makes only a
minor, remote contribution to the loss, a coverage denial “would
raise troubling questions regarding the clause’s consistency with
the efficient proximate cause doctrine. Denial of coverage for such
a loss would suggest the provision of illusory insurance against
weather conditions, raising concerns similar to those implicated in
280
Howell.”
IV. SUBROGATION REMEDIES
After an insurance company has paid out monies under its
policy, it may attempt to recover some or all of its payments from a
third party on the grounds that it is subrogated to the rights of its
insured. Subrogation is the equitable right of an insurer to be put
in the position of its insured so that it may pursue recovery from
any third party legally responsible to the insured for the loss paid
281
by the insurer. Property carriers bring many subrogation actions
because payment is triggered not on the fault of the insured, but
on the existence of a covered cause of loss. As a consequence,
property insurers often have cleaner subrogation rights than
liability insurers. Nevertheless, no automatic prohibition against
liability carriers seeking subrogation from third parties exists. An

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. at 905.
Id. at 909–10.
Id. at 905.
CAL. INS. CODE § 530 (2006).
See Julian, 110 P.3d at 912.
Id.
Id. at 911.
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1467–68 (8th ed. 2004).
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insurer, however, may not seek subrogation from one of its
policyholders. In addition, if the insured has not been completely
compensated for its loss, its claim to be “made whole” may interfere
with the insurer’s subrogation claims. Moreover, an insurer’s rights
to subrogation may be compromised or eliminated through a
provision in a construction contract whereby the insured waives its
subrogation rights.
It is not uncommon for one insurance company to seek
reimbursement from another insurer for losses paid out due to a
construction-related injury. Under Illinois law, the grounds upon
which one insurer can seek equitable subrogation from the other
are:
(1) the defendant carrier must be primarily liable to the
insured for a loss under a policy of insurance; (2) the
plaintiff must be secondarily liable to the insured for the
same loss under its policy; and (3) the plaintiff carrier
must have discharged its liability to the insured and at the
same time extinguish the liability of the defendant
282
carrier.
In one case, the plaintiff insurer was denied equitable
subrogation because it provided additional insured coverage to the
general contractor for liability arising out of the work of one
subcontractor; whereas, it sought subrogation from an insurer that
provided additional insured coverage to the general contractor for
283
liability arising out of a different subcontractor’s liability.
284
Therefore, the two insurers did not insure the same risk.
285
In Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. v. Mt. Hawley Insurance Co.,
the differences between equitable subrogation and equitable
contribution were discussed:
The right of subrogation is purely derivative. An insurer
entitled to subrogation is in the same position as an
assignee of the insured’s claim, and succeeds only to the
rights of the insured. The subrogated insurer is said to
“stand in the shoes” of its insured, because it has no
greater rights than the insured and is subject to the same
defenses assertable against the insured . . . . Equitable
contribution is entirely different. It is the right to recover,
282.
2004).
283.
284.
285.

Home Ins. Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 801 N.E.2d 997, 1000 (Ill. App. Ct.
Id. at 999.
See id.
20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 128 (Ct. App. 2004).
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not from the party primarily liable for the loss, but from a
co-obligor who shares such liability with the party seeking
contribution. In the insurance context, the right to
contribution arises when several insurers are obligated to
indemnify or defend the same loss or claim, and one
insurer has paid more than its fair share of the loss or
defended the action without any participation by the
286
others.
These legal principles formed the context within which a
subcontractor’s insurer was denied equitable contribution from the
general contractor’s insurer due to the indemnity agreement
287
The indemnity provision
contained in the insureds’ contract.
required the subcontractor to indemnify the general contractor for
loss except that occasioned by the general contractor’s sole
288
Under the circumstances, the court concluded that
negligence.
to require the general contractor’s insurer to contribute to the loss
paid by the subcontractor’s insurer when the general contractor
was not liable to the subcontractor for the loss would be
inconsistent with “equitable principles designed to accomplish
289
ultimate justice.”
An insurer’s subrogation interest can complicate an insured’s
ability to settle with a tortfeasor. Unless the insured can give the
286. Id. at 135 (quoting Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 77 Cal. Rptr.
2d 296, 303 (Ct. App. 1998)).
287. Id. at 140.
288. Id. at 136.
289. Id. at 139. Courts have held that where two or more insurers cover loss,
no right of contribution exists for the insurer that paid the loss on behalf of an
insured that owed broad indemnity to the insured of the non-contributing insurer.
See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Am. Intern. Spec. Lines, 365 F.3d 263
(4th Cir. 2004); Am. Indem. Lloyds v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 335 F.3d 429
(5th Cir. 2003); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. RLI Ins. Co., 292 F.3d 583 (8th Cir. 2002);
Continental Cas. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 238 F.3d 941 (8th Cir. 2000). See
also Home Ins. Co., 801 N.E.2d at 1003 (“In Illinois, an excess insurer cannot seek
equitable contribution from a primary insurer because excess and primary carriers
insure different risks. The rationale for such a holding is that the protections
under an excess policy do not begin until those under a primary policy have been
exhausted. Therefore, even if both Home and Cincinnati could be said to insure
Allied for the same loss, Home’s status as an excess insurer precludes it from
seeking equitable contribution from Cincinnati, a primary insurer.”) (citations
omitted); Land v. Tall House Bldg. Co., 602 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that construction contractor’s insurer could not bring contribution claim
against stucco manufacturer, where contractor could be liable to home purchasers
for construction defects based only on breach of contract and not tort and, thus,
contractor was precluded from being a joint tortfeasor who could recover from
another joint tortfeasor under contribution statute).
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tortfeasor assurance that its insurer will not pursue any subrogation
interest, a tortfeasor may be reluctant to participate in a partial
settlement. Jurisdictions have developed different ways to deal with
this situation. Minnesota, for example, distinguishes between firstparty automobile insurance disputes and those involving first-party
290
property insurance disputes. The automobile losses, governed by
the state’s No-Fault Insurance Act, require the insured to give
notice to the automobile insurer before reaching a settlement with
the tortfeasor so as to permit the insurer the right to preserve its
291
This same
subrogation rights by matching the tortfeasor’s offer.
mechanism, however, does not apply in the property insurance
context. The property insurance context is governed solely by
292
contract terms agreed to by the parties.
Under these
circumstances, the insurer’s denial of coverage benefits permits the
insured to freely settle with a tortfeasor and compromise the
insurer’s subrogation rights:
Thus, if the [Insurer’s] denial of coverage was erroneous,
such denial will have relieved Owner of the obligation to
protect [Insurer’s] subrogation rights and will have
authorized Owner to accept the Rule 68 offer of judgment
without the consent of [Insurer]. In so concluding, we
are mindful that an insurer such as [Insurer] must be
allowed a reasonable time to investigate the claims of its
insured before it can be found to have materially
breached the contract by the denial of coverage. But the
present facts show that [Insurer] had ample time to
investigate Owner’s claim and even to have its coverage
defenses determined by a declaratory judgment action if it
did not want to be confronted with the prospect of a
293
settlement between the Owner and the tortfeasors.
290. See Schwickert, Inc. v. Winnebago Seniors, Ltd., 680 N.W.2d 79 (Minn.
2004).
291. MINN. STAT. § 65B.53 (2005).
292. See Schwickert, 680 N.W.2d at 83.
293. Id. at 86; see also Youell v. Grimes, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1175 (D. Kan.
2002) (holding that erroneous denial of coverage in third-party liability insurance
relieves the insured of the obligation to protect the insurer’s subrogation rights);
Great Divide Ins. Co. v. Carpenter ex rel. Reed, 79 P.3d 599, 609–10 (Alaska 2003)
(holding that a settlement agreement by the insured with the tortfeasor without
the consent of the insurer did not relieve the insurer of its obligations under a
commercial general liability policy even where the insurer had provided a defense
but materially breached the policy by unreasonably refusing to consent to the
settlement); Home Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh, 658 N.W.2d 522,
534 (Minn. 2003) (holding that third-party liability insurer’s erroneous denial of

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007

55

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 3
6. O'CONNOR - ADC.DOC

232

12/15/2007 3:08:53 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1

Disputes can sometimes arise between insureds and insurers
over the sharing of recoveries from third-party tortfeasors. Where
an insured has not been fully reimbursed for its loss by the insurer,
potential exists for disagreement over just when the insurer’s
subrogation interest gets paid. Many jurisdictions adopt the “make
whole” principle, which holds that the insurer does not begin to
recover on its subrogation interest until the insured’s loss is paid in
294
full.
Sometimes insurance policies will contain provisions that
essentially give the insurer a contract right to subrogation, in
addition to whatever equitable rights of subrogation might arise by
virtue of its paying a loss under the policy. These “subrogation
provisions” should be distinguished from “reimbursement
provisions,” which require the insured to pay over to the insurer
295
any settlements received from third parties. As a general rule,
subrogation provisions are subject to the “make whole” principle,
and, therefore, the insurer’s contract subrogation rights will not
296
permit recovery until the insured is paid in full. Reimbursement
provisions, on the other hand, are not subject to the “make whole”
limitation and, therefore, may require an insured to pay all
settlement proceeds over to an insurer even though the insured has
297
not fully been reimbursed for its loss.
Not surprisingly, courts
tend to interpret policy provisions entitling the insurer to third298
party recoveries as “subrogation” provisions, where possible.
One of the greatest impediments to an insurer’s subrogation
rights is a contract provision whereby the insured waives its right of
subrogation.
These provisions are common in construction
contracts. Moreover, they are generally enforced. This may be the
case even where the tortfeasor against whom subrogation is sought
299
As a general rule, most construction
was grossly negligent.
coverage and failure to defend insured was a breach of contract that suspended
the obligation of the insured to provide notice that was otherwise required by the
policy).
294. See New Orleans Assets, L.L.C v. Woodward, 363 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2004).
295. Id. at 375–76.
296. Id. at 375.
297. But see id. at 376 n.7.
298. See id. at 372.
299. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Universal Builders Supply, 317 F.
Supp. 2d 336, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The Court concludes that New York courts
would likely permit waiver of subrogation clauses to bar claims of gross negligence
. . . .”). However, earlier cases concluded that waiver of subrogation could not bar
subrogated claims for gross negligence. See Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Morris
Goldman Real Estate Corp., 277 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Travelers Ind.
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contract waivers of subrogation are triggered upon the existence of
property coverage. In essence, they leave the loss with the property
insurer. For example, in Gray Insurance Co. v. Old Tyme Builders,
Inc., a property insurer claimed that a subcontractor waived the
subcontract’s waiver of subrogation by voluntarily undertaking to
300
repair its defective work.
The insurer sought to recover for the
301
The court rejected
consequential losses incurred by its insured.
this argument, finding that repairing one’s defective work does not
constitute a waiver of a contract right to be free from subrogation
302
claims.
Similarly, the Missouri Court of Appeals decision in
Nodaway Valley Bank v. E.L. Crawford Construction, Inc. discussed
whether the presence of an indemnity clause lessened or
eliminated the scope of coverage under a waiver of subrogation
303
clause. The property carrier seeking subrogation from a general
contractor and subcontractor argued that the broad indemnity
clauses contained in their contracts, running in favor of the
insured, did not limit the protection afforded by the contract’s
304
waiver of subrogation provision. The court disagreed:
Under the plain language of the clauses, the waiver of
subrogation clause prevents Bank [insurer was suing in
the insured’s name] from pursuing a claim against
Crawford & Crane for the fire damage to the extent that
such damage is covered by property insurance that
contract required Bank to obtain. Under the plain
language of the indemnification clause, Crawford agreed
to indemnify Bank for all property damage caused by any
act or omission of anyone who performs services under
the agreement. The indemnification clause is silent as to
whether the agreement to indemnify applies to damage
covered by property insurance. . . . In interpreting the
waiver of subrogation and indemnification provisions,
however, this court cannot merely look at the two clauses
in a vacuum. The clauses must be read in the context of
the entire contract. . . . A reasonable interpretation of the
indemnification clause that is in harmony with the
insurance procurement requirement and the waiver of
subrogation clause is that the indemnification clause
Co. of Conn. v. Losco Group, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
300. 878 So. 2d 603 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
301. Id. at 605.
302. Id. at 608.
303. 126 S.W.3d 820 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
304. Id. at 823.
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refers to compensation and liability for losses not covered
by the property insurance policy, that is, compensation
305
and liability to third parties.
A. Contractual Waivers of Subrogation
An insurer that pays out a loss on behalf of its insured is
subrogated to the rights of its insured to pursue those responsible
for the loss. A number of themes recur in subrogation cases.
Frequently, disputes arise between an insured and insurer over
priority where the insured has not been fully reimbursed for its
306
In the construction business, parties often waive rights to
loss.
seek recovery from one another to the extent property insurance
307
covers the loss.
The scope and enforceability of these waivers,
however, can be the subject of dispute.
Contractual waivers of subrogation rights are also common
features of commercial lease agreements. One such waiver played
a pivotal role in determining who bore the ultimate risk of loss of
308
one of the WTC buildings.
In addition to the collapse of
buildings One and Two of the WTC, building Seven was also lost as
309
Portions
a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
of the collapsing twin towers fell onto Seven WTC “causing the fires
to spread to that building, where they created another inferno,”
310
The building’s lessee,
resulting in the building’s collapse.
Silverstein Properties, Inc. (Silverstein), received a substantial
311
payment from its property insurer, Industrial Risk Insurers (IRI).
305. Id. at 826--30. See also Chubb Ins. Co. v. DeChambre, 808 N.E.2d 37, 42
(Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that under terms of property policy, subcontractor
was additional insured and, therefore, the anti-subrogation doctrine precluded
insurer’s claim against subcontractor); Midwestern Indem. Co. v. Sys. Builders,
Inc., 801 N.E.2d 661, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that waiver of subrogation
provision applied to losses incurred after the building was complete); S.
Tippecanoe Sch. Bldg. Corp. v. Shambaugh & Son, Inc., 395 N.E.2d 320, 327 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the insurance procurement clause alone established
that the parties had contracted away the risk of first-party property loss under the
all-risk carrier and that the contract did not require the presence of a waiver of
subrogation clause to accomplish this risk allocation scheme).
306. See generally 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW, supra note 27,
§ 11:102; 16 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 85, § 222:14.
307. 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW, supra note 27, § 7:154.
308. See Indus. Risk Insurers v. Port Auth., 387 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
309. Id. at 301.
310. Id.
311. Id.
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In turn, “IRI sued the airlines, the airport security companies, and
the airline manufacturer for allowing the terrorists to board and
312
hijack the planes.”
The insurer also “sued the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey . . . , the owner of 7 WTC, and Citigroup,
313
IRI
Inc.,” a sublessee of a substantial portion of the building.
alleged that Citigroup was grossly negligent in designing and
installing an “emergency generator system that utilized an
unreasonable amount of diesel fuel and that continuously pumped
that fuel unreasonably close to critical structural supports in the
314
building without proper safeguards.”
IRI alleged that the
building’s collapse was due, in part, to this system catching fire and
315
weakening critical structural supports.
Citigroup defended on the grounds that its lease with
316
IRI
Silverstein contained a waiver of subrogation provision.
countered by claiming that it would be against public policy to
317
shield Citigroup from liability for its gross negligence.
While
New York law does invalidate waivers purporting to exonerate a
party for willful or grossly negligent acts, one needs to do more
than simply make the allegation:
The purpose, then, of excepting claims of gross
negligence from the rule permitting the release of claims
for negligence, is to ensure that parties will have legal
recourse for injuries from particularly malicious behavior.
The rule exists to protect parties in positions of weaker
bargaining power from unknowingly agreeing in advance
to allow the other party to recklessly disregard its rights in
broad and unforeseeable ways.
However, parties,
especially those of equal bargaining power, should be able
to rely upon the general New York rule that enforces
contracts for the release of claims of liability. If a party
needs only to add gross negligence as a theory of liability
to force litigation to proceed through discovery and a
trial, contracting parties would be stripped of the

312. Id.
313. Id. at 302.
314. Indus. Risk Insurers v. Port Auth., 387 F. Supp. 2d at 302 (quoting Pl.’s
Am. Compl. ¶ 55, Indus. Risk Insurers v. Port Auth., 387 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (No. 02 Civ. 7170)).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 304.
317. Id. at 306.
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substantial benefit of their bargain, that is, avoiding the
318
expense of lengthy litigation.
Simply misdesigning a generator system without more did not
319
rise to the level of “reckless disregard.”
The Second Circuit, applying New York law, came to a similar
conclusion in a case involving a waiver of subrogation clause
contained in a construction contract. In St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. v. Universal Builders Supply, the owner sought to erect a
320
building in Times Square, New York City.
The construction
contract required the owner to secure Builder’s Risk insurance
321
policy, which contained a broad waiver of subrogation clause.
On a more unusual note, the contract also required the contractor
to obtain “similar waivers, each in favor of all parties enumerated
322
above.” Notwithstanding this obligation, the contractor’s liability
insurers reserved their right to seek subrogation for any covered
323
loss.
A forty-nine story scaffolding, designed and built by the
contractor, collapsed, causing extensive damage to the site and
324
surrounding area, and resulting in the death of one person. The
owner’s builder’s risk carrier paid $19 million to satisfy the
325
The insurer then
property claims arising out of the collapse.
brought a subrogation claim against the contractor, alleging,
318. Id. at 307.
319. Id. at 309–10. See also Great N. Ins. Co. v. Paino Assocs., 364 F. Supp. 2d 7
(D. Mass. 2005) (raising questions of joint liability where tenant’s property insurer
brings subrogation action against landlord for negligent supervision of employee
that started fire in restroom); Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co. v. Vaszil, 873 A.2d
1030 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (“insurer had right of subrogation, in light of lease
language making the tenant liable for damage caused to premises”); Burns Int’l
Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that where tenant’s property insurer brought subrogation action against
landlord’s security contractor to recover for theft loss, comparative fault statute
applied and permitted apportionment among security contractor, tenant, and
non-party landlord); Rausch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 882 A.2d 801 (Md. 2005)
(discussing at length the “no subrogation per se” rule between landlord and
tenants, explaining that even in the absence of a contractual waiver in the lease,
the landlord’s insurer has no subrogation right against tenant as both are
considered co-insureds under the policy); McEwan v. Mountain Land Support
Corp., 116 P.3d 955 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (holding that where lease did not
require tenant to obtain separate property insurance, landlord’s insurer could not
seek subrogation as tenant was a co-insured under the policy).
320. 409 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2005).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 83.
323. Id. at 78.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 78.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss1/3

60

O'Connor: Recent Issues in Property Coverage
6. O'CONNOR - ADC.DOC

2007]

12/15/2007 3:08:53 PM

RECENT ISSUES IN PROPERTY COVERAGE

237

326

among other things, a claim of gross negligence.
The insurer
argued that well-established New York law did not permit
exculpatory provisions to be enforced where the loss was the result
327
of gross negligence.
The Second Circuit, however, rejected this
argument, finding that a “waiver of subrogation” provision is
328
different than an exculpatory clause.
Waivers of subrogation
agreements, like indemnity provisions, “shift the source of
compensation without restricting the injured party’s ability to
329
By contrast, exculpatory clauses deprive the victim of
recover.”
330
With respect to the contractor’s obligation to
compensation.
obtain similar waivers, the court found that this promise extended
only to property coverage—which the contractor did not secure—
and did not require waivers from the contractor’s liability
331
carriers.
B. Equitable Subrogation vs. Equitable Contribution
The Supreme Court of Illinois issued an interesting decision in
Home Insurance Co. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., where it denied an
insurer the right to seek equitable contribution from another
332
While
insurer because the carriers did not insure the same risk.
both carriers provided additional insured coverage to a general

326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 86.
329. Id. (quoting Austro v. Niagra Mohawk Power Corp., 487 N.E.2d 267 (N.Y.
1985)).
330. Id. at 85.
331. Id. See also S.C. Nestel, Inc. v. Future Constr., Inc., 836 N.E.2d 445 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2005) (holding that subcontractor’s failure to give notice to general
contractor before hiring a sub-subcontractor did not amount to gross negligence
or willful misconduct and hence enforced waiver of subrogation provision);
Reliance Nat’l Indem. v. Knowles Indus. Servs., Corp., 868 A.2d 220 (Me. 2005)
(holding waiver of subrogation rights enforceable even in the face of claims of
gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct and regardless of alleged
violation of positive statutory duty concerning historic properties); Behr v. Hook,
787 A.2d 499 (Vt. 2001) (holding that the AIA waiver clause protects
subcontractor for gross negligence). But see Colonial Props. Realty, Ltd. v. Lowder
Const. Co., 567 S.E.2d 389 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding waiver-of-subrogation
clauses ineffective against gross negligence claim); Daimler-Chrysler Corp. v.
Graves Sheet Metal, 827 N.E.2d 607, 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that waiver
of subrogation clause in prime contract does not bar owner’s gross negligence
claim against contractor: “[u]nder Michigan law, a party may not contract against
liability for its own gross negligence.”).
332. 821 N.E.2d 269, 316 (Ill. 2004).
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333

contractor, they did so for different named insureds.
Under the
facts of this case, the plaintiff insurer was deemed to be excess and
334
the defendant insurer primary. Under well-settled Illinois law, an
excess carrier does not insure the same risk as a primary carrier
335
The
and, therefore, no right of equitable contribution existed.
plaintiff insurer, however, was entitled to seek equitable
subrogation, except for the fact that it waived its right by failing to
seek full reimbursement from defendant insurer during the
336
underlying litigation.
C. Anti-subrogation Rule
Contractors and subcontractors may have an additional avenue
of protection against the subrogation claims of property insurers
beyond an express contractual waiver of subrogation contained in
many standard form construction contracts. A well-established rule
of insurance law exists that an insurer may not subrogate against its
337
own insured. Therefore, if the contractor is deemed an insured
under the builder’s risk policy, the carrier may not be entitled to
subrogate against it. This is sometimes referred to as the “antisubrogation rule.” The trick, of course, is to be deemed an insured
under the policy. In Tri-State Insurance Co. of Minnesota v.
Commercial Group West, LLC, a subcontractor was unsuccessful in
obtaining insured status under a builder’s risk policy sufficient to
338
The court rejected the
invoke the anti-subrogation rule.
subcontractor’s analogy to the landlord/tenant case law, holding
that a tenant is a co-insured under the landlord’s property policy
339
unless the lease expressly states otherwise.
The privity of a
landlord/tenant relationship is closer than the privity that exists
340
between an owner and a subcontractor.
Thus, where the policy
does not name the subcontractor as a co-insured under the policy,
the status of its relationship as a subcontractor does not give it
blanket immunity from the property carrier’s claims, merely

333. Id. at 310.
334. Id. at 317.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 326–27.
337. Andrew B. Downs et al., Recent Developments in Property Insurance Law, 34
TORT & INS. L.J. 619, 636 (1999).
338. 698 N.W.2d 483, 492 (N.D. 2005).
339. Id. at 488.
340. Id.
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because the property insurance covered some of the
341
subcontractor’s property.
An insurer that pays a loss under its policy is usually
subrogated to the rights of its insured to recover some or all of its
payment from third parties who are responsible for the loss in the
first instance. Property insurers are fairly diligent at pursuing their
subrogation rights against contractors and design professionals
responsible for property losses. Perhaps the greatest impediment
to the exercise of this remedy in the construction industry is the
common practice of insureds waiving their subrogation rights.
Most standard form contracts contain a “waiver of subrogation”
provision by which the owner waives its subrogation rights against
contractors, subcontractors, and design professionals to the extent
342
These waivers are
its losses are covered by property insurance.
343
routinely upheld.
Other impediments can exist to pursuing subrogation
341. Id. at 492. See also Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Gage Plumbing & Heating
Co., Inc., 433 F.2d 1051, 1055 (10th Cir. 1970) (finding that where property policy
covered unnamed subcontractor’s property, it was a co-insured); Travelers Indem.
Co. v. Losco Group, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 556, 561–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that
an unnamed contractor is not co-insured because there was nothing in the
language of the policy to show an intention to benefit the contractor); Richmond
Steel, Inc. v. Legal & Gen. Assurance Soc’y, Ltd., 821 F. Supp. 793, 799 (D.P.R.
1993) (noting that an unnamed subcontractor is not co-insured, because policy
language is not sufficiently expansive to cover subcontractor absent a “property of
others” clause); Baugh-Belarde Const. Co. v. Coll. Utils. Corp., 561 P.2d 1211,
1216 (Alaska 1977) (applying the anti-subrogation rule in the context of a
builder’s risk policy for an unnamed party); La. Fire Ins. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co.,
38 So. 2d 807, 808 (La. Ct. App. 1949) (re-inforcing the same principle expressed
in Transamerica); Willis Realty Assocs. v. Cimino Const. Co., 623 A.2d 1287, 1289
(Me. 1993) (reasoning that a contractor is not impliedly co-insured under policy
because coverage does not extend to personal property of others within the
control of the named insured); Factory Ins. Ass’n v. Donco Corp., 496 S.W.2d 331,
332–34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (finding that an unnamed contractor was co-insured
under policy which contained an “also covers” provision that included similar
property of others); McBroome-Bennett Plumbing, Inc. v. Villa France, Inc., 515
S.W.2d 32, 35 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (stating that an unnamed subcontractor that
did not pay for insurance premiums and only had interest in certain tools on
property was not co-insured under builder’s risk policy).
342. See BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW, supra note 27, § 11:100.
343. See Factory Mut. Ins. Co. v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 709 N.W.2d 82, 84
(Wis. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that a subrogation waiver in contract between
contractor and manufacturing facility was enforceable and thus waiver precluded
insurer from pursuing contractor or its general liability insurer for subrogation).
But see Reed & Reed, Inc. v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 431 F.3d 384, 388 (1st Cir. 2005)
(noting that the waiver of a subrogation clause contained in “idiosyncratic”
contract documents did not apply to post-construction activities).
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remedies. In some jurisdictions, an insurer’s right to subrogate
against non-participating insurers is limited to insurers assuming
the same risks as the carrier seeking subrogation. The Illinois
Supreme Court had occasion to address this issue in Home Insurance
344
Co. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., where it explained in detail the
differences
between
contribution,
indemnification,
and
subrogation rights in the context of multiple insurers:
The terms “contribution,” “indemnification,” and
“subrogation” are often used interchangeably, but there
are distinct differences between [sic] them. The remedies
of contribution and indemnity are mutually exclusive, and
contribution is prohibited where a party has a right to
indemnity. Contribution, as it pertains to insurance law, is
an equitable principle arising among coinsurers which
permits one insurer who has paid the entire loss, or
greater than its share of the loss, to be reimbursed from
other insurers who are also liable for the same loss.
Contribution applies to multiple, concurrent insurance
situations and is only available where the concurrent
policies insure the same entities, the same interests, and
the same risks. These elements must be met before the
insurance can be considered concurrent or double.
Accordingly, when two insurers cover separate and
distinct risks, there can be no contribution among them.
In contrast to contribution, subrogation and
indemnification are devices for placing the entire burden
for a loss on the party ultimately liable or responsible for
it and by whom it should have been discharged.
Indemnification differs from subrogation in that the
entity seeking indemnification does so in its own right,
while in the latter the subrogee succeeds to another’s
right to payment.
It is well settled that the doctrine of equitable
contribution is not applicable to primary/excess insurer
issues. This is because by definition the policies do not
cover the same risks—the protections under the excess
policy do not begin until those of the primary policy
345
cease.
344. 821 N.E.2d 269 (Ill. 2004).
345. Id. at 276–77 (citations omitted) (holding that plaintiff excess insurer was
not entitled to equitable contribution from primary carriers but was entitled to
pursue that portion of equitable subrogation it had not waived). See also Safeco
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 841, 842 (Ct. App. 2006)

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss1/3

64

O'Connor: Recent Issues in Property Coverage
6. O'CONNOR - ADC.DOC

2007]

12/15/2007 3:08:53 PM

RECENT ISSUES IN PROPERTY COVERAGE

241

Another restriction on an insurer’s ability to secure a
subrogation remedy is the superior equities doctrine.
This
restrictive principle prevents an insurer from recovering against a
346
party whose equities are equal or superior to those of the insurer.
This doctrine is usually invoked in the context where the insurer is
seeking to subrogate against third parties who are not other
insurers. In some jurisdictions, the application of this doctrine
depends on whether the source of the insurer’s right to
subrogation arises by operation of law (legal or equitable
subrogation) or by contract (conventional subrogation).
Jurisdictions that make this distinction usually limit its application
to instances where the insurer seeks to enforce the terms of a
347
separate contract between its insured and a third party.
In State
Farm General Insurance Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., State Farm
argued that a fire on its insureds’ property was the result of
respondents’ negligence in failing to provide proper fire-safe
equipment and its failure to keep combustible items away from one
348
another.
The court determined that the superior equities
doctrine applied and remanded the matter for determination of
whether the defendants were in a better position to avoid the loss
than the insurer or its insured:
Contrary to the extreme positions advanced by the
parties, we conclude the issue is whether respondents
were in a better position to avoid the loss than State Farm
or its insureds. State Farm alleges that respondents
negligently permitted the fire to spread to its insureds’
(stating that in an action for equitable contribution, the settling insurer meets its
burden of proof when it makes a prima facie showing of coverage under the nonparticipating insurer’s policy and the burden then shifts to the recalcitrant insurer
to prove the absence of actual coverage); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Home
Assurance Co., Inc., 858 N.E.2d 530, 533 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (finding owner’s
insurer not entitled to equitable subrogation from subcontractor’s insurer due to
policy exclusion; the “mend the hold” doctrine did not apply as subcontractor’s
insurer did not materially change its coverage position once litigation ensued).
346. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 519 (8th ed. 2004).
347. See Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Elizabeth State Bank, 265 F.3d 601, 626–28
(7th Cir. 2001); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Riggs Nat’l Bank of
Wash., D.C., 646 A.2d 966, 967 (D.C. 1994); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 552 N.E.2d 870, 874 (N.Y. 1990). Other jurisdictions, such as California,
place no emphasis on this distinction. See Meyers v. Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav.
Ass’n, 77 P.2d 1084, 1087, 1090 (Cal. 1938) (exploring the superior equities
doctrine in the context of a subrogation action brought against neighboring
landowner and property manager by an insurer that paid for a fire loss to a
condominium association and one of its unit owners).
348. 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 785 (Ct. App. 2006).
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property by failing to provide non-combustible metal trash
cans, failing to promulgate and post rules establishing a
system for the safe disposal of fireplace ashes, and failing
to keep combustible materials (i.e., trash cans) a safe
distance away from other combustible materials (i.e., wood
fencing and siding). The failure to provide the safe
disposal of ashes arguably could be characterized as
promoting or encouraging the spread of fire. Moreover,
the implementation of a method for safe disposal of fire
ashes, including appropriate trash cans, possibly could
have prevented the fire from occurring.
....
The gravamen of State Farm’s subrogation claim in the
present case is that respondents negligently permitted a
fire to occur and to spread to its insureds’ property. It
seems inequitable to bar State Farm from pursuing its
claim against respondents solely because they did not
place the ignition source in the trash can [they did not
actually start the fire].
Subrogation advances an
important policy rationale underlying the tort system by
forcing a wrongdoer who helped to cause a loss to bear
the burden of reimbursing the insurer for payments made
to its insured as a result of the wrongdoer’s acts and
omissions.
In the case at bench the contest is between an innocent
insurance company (which admittedly received premiums
for the very loss that occurred) and alleged tortfeasors
(who did not physically start the fires but whose
negligence allegedly permitted the fire to be started and
to spread by failing to provide for the safe disposal of
fireplace ashes). On this record, we cannot say that
respondents are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
349
based on the doctrine of superior equities.
D. Assignment of Remedies
Whereas subrogation arises by operation of law, a party’s
assignment rights arise out of contract. Where an insurer declines
to provide a defense or indemnification, thereby leaving its insured
exposed to direct loss from a third-party claim, the insured may be
inclined to settle the lawsuit by assigning its rights under the
349.

Id. at 800–01 (citations omitted).
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insurance policy to the claimant. Many insurance policies contain
an anti-assignment clause. These clauses generally restrict the
insured from assigning the policy without the prior written consent
of the company. Unless the clause is expressly drafted to apply to
post-loss situations, the majority position is that the limitation
applies only in a pre-loss context:
The Vermont Supreme Court has not addressed
whether a post-loss assignment violates the antiassignment clause of an insurance policy. When state law
is not clear, this court must predict how the highest court
would rule. . . . This court may consider decisions in other
jurisdictions on the same or analogous issues. . . . [T]he
majority rule developed in many states that an antiassignment clause is valid with respect to transfers that
were made prior to, but not after, the insured-against loss
has occurred.
The reasoning behind the development of this rule is
premised on the nature of the contract. An insurer has
bargained to accept the risk presented by the particular
insured with whom it has contracted. The insurer’s
exposure to risk is altered if the insured assigns the policy
to another before there is a covered loss. Hence, this rule
protects the insurer’s interest in insulating itself from
unforeseen risk. However, once the loss occurs, the
insurer is obligated to cover the loss agreed to under the
terms of the policy. This obligation is not altered when
the claimant is not the party who was originally insured.
The accrual of an insurance claim extinguishes the
insurer’s interest in the risk profile of the insured, thereby
converting the claim into, in effect, a chose in action.
Hence, after the loss occurs there is no additional risk to
the insurance company if the insured assigns its right to
any claims or proceeds under the policy to another. After
the loss the anti-assignment clause serves only to limit the
free assignability of the claims, which is not favored by
350
law.
350. R.L. Vallee, Inc. v. Am. Intern. Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 431 F. Supp. 2d
428, 434–35 (D. Vt. 2006) (inner quotations and citations omitted). See also
Globecon Group, LLC v. Hartford Ins. Co., 434 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 2006)
(stating that anti-assignment clause applies only to pre-loss assignments); Noya v.
A.W. Coulter Trucking Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 588 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding that
a liability insurer that refused tender of defense may not intervene once insured
has agreed to a settlement that assigns to underlying plaintiffs any recovery in a
future bad-faith action as intervention would cause substantial prejudice to the
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V. CONCLUSION
Managing risk in the construction industry is a complex web of
contract allocation, mitigation techniques, and third-party
products. Property insurance forms the nucleus of all third-party
products, which include a variety of insurance products and, on
occasion, payment security devices such as payment bonds, letters
of credit, and performance guarantees, like performance bonds.
Property insurance is intended to respond to such major risks as
fire, wind, and water, and their effects of the elements on the
project. Property coverage plays a central role in any risk
management matrix. Unlike liability coverages, which are offered
through relatively standard policies, property coverage is more
varied. Many issues, however, recur. It is critical for construction
law practitioners to understand basic property coverages and the
common legal issues that arise in connection with this crucial risk
management product.

insured and the plaintiffs); Antal’s Rest., Inc. v. Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co., 680
A.2d 1386 (D.C. 1996) (citing cases from Alabama, Maine, Wisconsin, California,
Georgia, Illinois, and New York); Conrad Bros. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 640 N.W.2d
231, 237–38 (Iowa 2001) (noting the weight of authority supporting the majority
rule and citing to cases from Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Texas, North
Carolina, Delaware, Missouri, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, Washington,
and West Virginia).
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